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ABSTRACT 
APPLYING STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR 
CONFLICT-SENSITIVE EDUCATION IN THE SOMALI EDUCATION SECTOR 
 
SEPTEMBER 2018 
NINA ARISTEA PAPADOPOULOS 
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
M.A., AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 
Ed.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST 
Directed by Ash Hartwell, College of Education 
 
This research represents the growing convergence of two previously discrete 
fields: education in conflict and crisis, and stakeholder analysis. Momentum for an 
improved and more sophisticated approach to education in conflict and crisis is gaining 
speed. We are now engaged in a crucial analysis of the interaction between the conflict or 
crisis and the education system, with focus on how this interaction is displayed within 
power and physical structures, relationships, resource allocation, and content. Through 
this research, I argue that central to the achievement and success of conflict sensitivity in 
education resides the analysis of key stakeholder positions and behaviors, including the  
intentions, interrelations, agendas, interests, and resources they bring.  
In this dissertation, I accomplish the following: 
 1.     Review the evolution of education in crisis and conflict contexts, and key 
theories and traditions that underpin the analysis and application of conflict sensitivity in 
education. 
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2.     Document and analyze the components of policy and practice issue(s) that 
have the potential to improve conflict sensitivity in education programs in Somalia. 
3.     Identify key primary and secondary stakeholders, including both individuals 
and groups, and create tools and a typology for further analysis and characterization. 
4.     Make conclusions regarding key stakeholder positions and behaviors around 
conflict-sensitive education, including power relations, perspective, and degree of 
influence.   
 This dissertation provides evidence that achieving a more conflict-sensitive 
education system is less an isolated accomplishment, but rather reflects recognition of the 
behaviors and relative influence of stakeholders within the education system itself. It 
improve understanding of what motivates individuals or groups to enact the changes that 
lead to a more conflict-sensitive education system. This relatively new construct needs to 
be applied and analyzed in order for teachers, parents, education planners, and donors to 
better understand its benefits, utility, and challenges. By mapping and analyzing 
characteristics of key stakeholders, including their positions and behaviors around efforts 
to effect improvements in education I explore their power dynamics, perspectives, and 
ability to influence changes within the design and implementation of conflict-sensitive 
education programs in Somalia.  
 
Keywords:  conflict-sensitive education, Somalia education, stakeholder analysis, 
education policy, fragile states, conflict-affected, international education 
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CHAPTER 1   
INTRODUCTION 
The economist Samir Rihani asked, ‘Why are development experts not more 
expert at what they do... regular failure on that scale often points to major systemic 
problems…’ (Rihani, 2002: xiv).  
In the former Yugoslavia, Syria, the Horn of Africa, the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, and Kashmir, among others, the shadow or direct impact of conflict permeates 
daily living, and the effects on the most vulnerable, which include the very young, call 
for urgent attention. Addressing the education-related needs of children and youth in 
conflict and crisis-impacted1 (CCI)-environments has emerged as a global priority 
(UNESCO, 2011; USAID, 2011). Despite a worldwide decrease in the number of out-of-
school children in the early part of the millennium, CCI environments did not benefit 
nearly as much as more stable environments. According to UNESCO, 42 percent (28 
million) of the world total of primary school-age children in CCI countries are out of 
school (UNESCO, 2011). Young people in impoverished CCI countries are less likely to 
be literate2 than young people in other poor countries, with 79 percent and 93 percent, 
respectively, having learned to read (United Nations, 2017).  
                                                
1 The terms crisis, conflict, and crisis-and-conflict-impacted (CCI) will be used here 
broadly to identify issues and settings related to conflict, post-conflict, complex disasters, 
and transitional environments. These comprise a host of elements, including security, 
drivers of conflict/crisis, relief or development architecture and actors, and finally the 
social, political, and economic climate. 
2 Alas, many children in conflict zones never even make it to school; children in conflict-
affected poor countries are twice as likely to die before their fifth birthday compared to 
children in other poor countries. (UNESCO, 2011) 
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This research project was conducted in Somalia, a country currently experiencing 
high levels of cyclical conflict and characterized as having extremely fragile education 
systems. Somalia is currently challenged as a low-income state plagued by warlordism, 
fundamentalist rebel attacks, and low educational attainments. Donors like USAID, 
UNICEF, and DfID are making large investments in attempts to build effective and 
equitable education systems, which means there are a large group of external education 
actors that bring in additional funding, new ideas, and priorities. 
A professed urgency to tackle the issue of educating children in CCI 
environments has been underscored in reports highlighting the failure of various 
international efforts to adequately address the issue. The World Bank’s 2011 World 
Development Report announced that no conflict-impacted states had reached a single 
Millenium Development Goal (MDG), one of which was to achieve universal primary 
education (World Bank, 2011).  
Of course, the challenges facing populations in conflict and crisis are many. CCI 
environments are complex and often chaotic, typically featuring weak government 
legitimacy, fractured social institutions, and dispersed populations living in fear. 
Evidence suggests that conflict can reverse decades of economic growth, erase 
investments in public health systems, and undermine resiliencies in livelihoods. Thus, it 
is not surprising that conflict would also erode opportunities for education  (USAID, 
2013; World Bank, 2011).  
The concept of conflict-sensitive education (CSE) has gained increasing attention 
since it gained wider recognition in the late 1990s as one approach toward meeting the 
challenges of education in CCI environments. CSE advances a specific application of 
 3 
conflict-sensitivity from the field of international development, which, as defined by the 
Conflict Sensitivity Consortium3, which holds that conflict-sensitivity means gaining 
a sound understanding of the two-way interaction between development activities and 
context (Consortium, 2014). In general, context refers to physical structures, 
relationships, resource allocation, and other elements of the environment (INEE, 2013; 
UNESCO-IIEP, 2011; USAID, 2013). The opposite of conflict-sensitive, is conflict-
blind.  
As applied to CCI, the UN Inter Agency Network for Education in Emergencies 
(INEE)4 has defined conflict-sensitive education (CSE) to be a rubric that prioritizes the 
conflict-embedded educational context. Thus, CSE recognizes a two-way interaction 
between, on one hand, a CCI context, and the other, the development, planning, and 
delivery of educational programs and policies. These occur across what Davies has aptly 
described as the “education-conflict interface” (Davies, 2005).  
The CSE approach recognizes the “other face” of education (Bush and Saltarelli, 
2000), which acknowledges that educational systems can be manipulated to drive a 
wedge between people. Tactics include a deliberate uneven distribution of education as a 
means of creating and preserving positions of social, economic, and political privilege; 
using education as weapon of cultural repression by, for example, politicizing historical 
                                                
3 Comprises 37 agencies spread over 4 countries: Kenya, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka and 
the UK. Founding members include CAFOD/Caritas, CARE, Plan, Save the Children, 
and World Vision.  
4 INEE is a global network consisting of members from NGOs, UN agencies, donor 
agencies, governments, academic institutions, schools, and affected populations 
supporting the right to quality and safe education in emergencies and post-crisis recovery 
(www.ineesite.org). 
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accounts or disseminating stereotypical and ethno-racist ideas; and outright denial of 
education as a weapon of war. This leads to the ultimate guiding “do-no-harm” ethic of 
CSE to minimize negative impacts and maximize positive impacts of education policies 
and programming on conflict within an organizations’ given policies (INEE, 2013).  
While the concepts involved in CSE are largely agreed upon and held to be 
important (Mundy & Peterson, 2011; Smith & Vaux, 2003; McCandless, 2012), a very 
limited number of practical tools exist to assist agencies and education system actors to 
put CSE into practice and test its effectiveness (Sigsgaard, 2012; UNESCO-IIEP, 2011). 
Operationalizing conflict-sensitivity in education is a challenge, one for which tailored 
tools can provide a framework from which to depart. Currently there are two normative 
tools for exploring and analyzing conflict-sensitivity in relation to education. These 
include: the INEE Conflict Sensitive Education Pack and USAID’s Checklist for Conflict 
Sensitivity in Education. These represent an evolution of the "education in emergencies"5 
development discourse, which has moved from a rights-based approach to recognizing 
the complexity and potential for bias that is inherent in education systems. The first 
instrument, INEE’s Conflict Sensitivity in Education Pack (2013), serves as an 
introduction to the basic concepts and key principles that underpin CSE. It includes three 
key tools: 1) the INEE Guidance Note on Conflict-Sensitive Education, which introduces 
key concepts related to CSE programming and describes strategies to implement conflict-
sensitive programs and policies that are harmonized with the INEE Minimum Standards 
                                                
5 Education in emergencies can be defined as: A set of linked project activities that 
enable structured learning to continue in times of acute crisis or long-term instability. 
Nicoali, S. (2003). Education in Emergencies: A toolkit for starting and managing 
education in emergencies. London: Save the Children, U.K. 
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for Education; 2) the Diagnostic Programme Tool for Conflict Sensitive Education; and 
3) the Guiding Principles to Integrate Conflict Sensitivity in Education Policies and 
Programming. 
The more practical of the tools, USAID’s Checklist for Conflict-Sensitivity in 
Education Programs (USAID, 2013), is organized around several aspects of the 
education system: commitment and accountability, strategy, procurement and data, 
equitable access, curricula teaching and learning, capacity building, community 
engagement, information management systems, and monitoring and evaluation. The 
Checklist offers a practical framework for analyzing the operational and technical aspects 
of education programs. 
While these tools have provided a general framework for defining and analyzing 
CSE, their effectiveness remains in question in light of persistent levels of diminished 
educational quality in educational systems and regional areas where they have been 
applied . While the existing CSE construct has been supported as an important 
contribution to advancing equity and learning in CCI environments (Smith, 2005; 
Symposium, 2013; Smith, 2011; Richards & Bekele, 2011), it does not currently factor in 
the characteristics or biases  inherent in the behaviors of key stakeholders, and what 
conditions would be necessary for these stakeholders to change their behavior from 
reinforcing bias and exclusion to conflict-sensitivity.  
This research draws conceptually on the three main bodies of work that are 
central to the definition, understanding and analysis of the conflict-sensitivity construct: 
the INEE Conflict Sensitivity in Education (CSE) pack (INEE, 2013); Education Above 
All’s preliminary review of conflict-sensitive education policy (Sigsgaard, 2012); and 
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USAID’s Checklist for Conflict-Sensitivity in Education Programs (USAID, 2013), a 
practical tool that explores various aspects of an education system for conflict-sensitivity. 
These will be further described in Chapter 2: Theory and Practice.  
Each of these bodies of work makes a useful contribution to the construct of 
conflict-sensitivity in education, yet none of them has been fully assessed through 
evidence from application and field evaluations, and none has been incorporated into a 
national educational system in a CCI environment. Moreover, none of these tools 
includes a systematic analysis of the positions of key stakeholders and decision makers 
associated with the education sector, and how these characteristics influence decision-
making and ultimately action around ensuring a more equitable and just education 
system.  
While there is considerable evidence establishing the harmful and/or positive 
effects that schooling can have on learners and society, little attention has been paid to 
how conflict-sensitivity can be systematically and effectively applied and incorporated 
into education programs. This research examines the expansion of the CSE construct to 
include the systematic generation of knowledge about relevant stakeholders, specifically 
those within the education delivery system of Somalia, so as to better understand their 
behavior, intentions, interrelations, agendas, and interests. This analysis will ultimately 
assist in the assessment of the feasibility of future conflict-sensitive policy and practice 
decisions. It explores whether mainstreaming critical analysis around schooling, conflict, 
and stakeholders is a necessary step to ensure that learners receive equitable access to 
impartial, nondiscriminatory, safe learning opportunities.  
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We stand at a critical moment within the education domain in Somalia: the 
proposal from various key actors to conduct an updated assessment of the education 
sector in order to develop the education-sector strategy. I argue that the analysis of key 
stakeholder positions and behaviors, including intentions, interrelations, agendas, 
interests, and resources, is central to the achievement and success of conflict-sensitivity 
in education. 
Purpose of the Study 
The ultimate purpose of the study is to contribute to a deeper understanding of the 
conditions necessary to foster an education system in Somalia that has the potential to 
promote peace in fragile, unpredictable, and conflicted environments, and to unearth 
those areas that can be strategically chosen and framed on which agreement – using 
further analysis and consultation – can be reached so as to achieve greater collective, 
supported action.  
The research is focused on exploring whether this can be accomplished through 
the mapping and analysis of characteristics of key stakeholders, including their positions 
and behaviors around efforts to effect improvements in education, a technique being 
applied in various fields currently. Using a stakeholder analysis framework, I map out 
who the key stakeholders are within the education domain and then explore their power 
dynamics, perspectives, and ability to influence changes within the design and 
implementation of conflict-sensitive education programs in Somalia.  
This study explores key theoretical perspectives embedded in stakeholder analysis 
aimed to contribute to our ability to better analyze, design, and implement effective 
conflict-sensitive education programs. Central to improvements in educational outcomes 
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are changes in the way education is provided; these changes are typically led by policy 
formulation and decision-making. Moving beyond theories, an investigative approach in 
analyzing education in Somalia details the application of the conflict-sensitive education 
construct. Informed by the key existing instruments, I used USAID’s Checklist for 
Conflict Sensitivity in Education through a participatory and systematic analysis.  
Research Questions 
Against the backdrop of both the unpredictable and unstable nature of fragile 
contexts and the power structures in place at various levels that promote bias and block 
sensitivity to drivers of conflict, the central research question is: How might the “conflict-
sensitivity” construct help stakeholders in the Somali education sector conceptualize, 
articulate, design, and implement formal education programs that reduce conflict and 
increase equitable access to education?  
To address this fundamental question, this research attempts to answer the 
following more detailed questions in the context of Somalia:  
1. In the context of Somalia, who are the key stakeholders in policy, planning, 
managing, and implementing the education system, and what are their 
characteristics related to power and influence?  
2. What is the level of awareness and knowledge of the elements of CSE by the 
various stakeholders? What do they know about it?  
3. What are their priorities related to the elements of CSE?  
4. Who are the resisters and facilitators for this change? More importantly, who 
benefits and who might resist the change?  
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Based on the insights gained from the Somali case, this research attempts to draw 
more generalizable conclusions and transferable recommendations for how assessment, 
design, and evaluation of conflict-sensitive education can be strengthened in similar 
fragile environments.  
A few points having to do with the neo-colonial context and my own positionality 
are worthy of mention to set the context in which the research is conducted. 
First, it is important to highlight the neo-colonial influence and power in the role 
of donors, and international NGOs in shaping any theory of change, as well as the CSE 
framework itself. Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of an independent Ghana, helped 
to shape the concept of neo-colonialism which cautions about the possible backward 
impact of various forms of aid in relation to poverty reduction and sustainable progress in 
development in African countries (Nkrumah, 2009).  
Second, behind this research stands my personal biography. As team lead for the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), my positionality 
influenced who was included and who was not included as stakeholders in the research, 
as detailed in the sections below. I have had unique access to a wide range of education 
stakeholders, including Somali nationals, NGO staff, and international donors. At the 
same time, I had the unique ability and the legitimacy to convene these actors in order to 
collect the data necessary to produce this study. Holding the position of team lead for the 
USAID Education in Crisis and Conflict team drives my motivation, commitment, and 
passion to the research problem, and provides me with the influence, power, and 
relationships to engage in the dialogue with key stakeholders. However, my position 
limits my access to groups that contest government power and legitimacy, such as Al-
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Shabab, and clan militia leaders. It also presents the danger that this influence and power 
could manipulate stakeholder responses to interview questions. The details of how I deal 
with this are described in the Limitations section of Chapter 4 in the dissertation.  
Dissertation Summary 
In this dissertation, I perform the following:  
1. Review the evolution of education in crisis and conflict contexts, and key 
theories and traditions that underpin the analysis and application of conflict-
sensitivity in education. 
2. Document and analyze the components of the policy and practice issue(s) that 
have the potential to improve conflict-sensitivity in education programs in 
Somalia. 
3. Identify key primary and secondary stakeholders related to the Somali 
education sector, including both individuals and groups, and create tools and a 
typology for further analysis and characterization. 
4. Make conclusions regarding key stakeholder positions and behaviors around 
conflict-sensitive education, including power relations, perspectives, and 
degrees of influence. In particular,  I assess whose interests should be taken 
into account, and who or what groups are in a position to either strengthen or 
weaken the operationalization of education policies or actions aimed at 
improving conflict-sensitivity.  
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Organization of the Study 
Chapter 1 provides the introduction to the dissertation, including a statement of 
the purpose of the study, its main research questions, a dissertation summary, and this 
overview of organization. 
Chapter 2 reviews the practices that converge around conflict and education in the 
Somali context, including do-no-harm, aid effectiveness, and education in CCI states. It 
provides an historical and data-supported account of the current structure and conditions 
of the Somali education sector. 
Chapter 3 addresses related theory and research that has been conducted around 
education in conflict and crisis environments, and the relevant tools around promoting 
conflict-sensitivity in education. It also reviews the literature surrounding stakeholder 
theory.  
Chapter 4 reviews the research methodology employed, including major tools for 
extracting data for stakeholder analysis. Recognizing that stakeholder analysis in Somalia 
provides a “snap shot” of a rapidly changing context is a central point when discussing 
the limitations of this study. Particulary when the influence, position, and identity of the 
key stakehodlers are likely to change over time. Therefore I outline limitations and 
ethinical considerations, and describe how I position myself as the analyst. 
Chapter 5 provides primary findings regarding stakeholder identification, their 
priorities, and their understandings of elements that facilitate or block CSE are provided. 
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CHAPTER 2   
THE SOMALI EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IN CONTEXT 
The political, economic and social landscape of Somalia, often-described as 
"harsh," provides the base case for my analysis. More than two decades of conflict have 
nearly destroyed Somalia’s educational system, which is characterized by agonizingly 
low enrollment, especially in South Central Somalia, and poor quality in primary and 
secondary schools across Somalia, even in the relatively stable Somaliland and Puntland 
regions. The 2012 global Human Development Report estimates that a Somali child can 
expect to receive only 2.4 years of schooling. By comparison, 8.5 years is considered low 
for human development. To understand the roots that underpin these conditions requires 
an appreciation of the land and its history. In this chapter we provide a brief historical 
overview of Somalia, a description of how its education system is structured, and go into 
detail about the challenges faced by the system regarding enrollment, literacy, and the 
tensions that externally-backed private schooling has introduced. 
Rather than a country in the traditional sense, Somalia has often been described as 
a collection of territories, bounded by geography and clan, which has somehow managed 
to remain resilient in the absence of an effective central government, and after 
experiencing over two decades of foreign intervention, civil strife, civil war, 
humanitarian disaster and insecurity  (Møller, 2009).  
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Figure 2.1: Map of Somalia  
However fragile and fractured, Somalia is a sovereign African country in the 
Horn of Africa rich in history and heritage. Somalia is also a member of a number of 
many international organizations including the United Nations, African Union, Arab 
League, the African Development Bank, Group of 77, and the Intergovernmental 
Development Association. Somalia’s geographic positioning, shown in Figure 2.1, lends 
itself to important relationships with bordering northeast Kenya, and eastern Ethiopia. 
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These regions include major populations of ethnic Somalis divided by borders established 
by European powers in the nineteenth century. 
As the most easterly country in Africa with the longest coastline on the mainland 
(3,000 kilometers) Somalia has persistent strategic importance dating back to its role as a 
trading center in the ancient world. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 solidified 
Somalia’s strategic location in the modern world.  
In 1886 US and European countries met in Berlin to divide the African countries 
between them. What we know as Somalia was divided into three provinces: British 
Somalia, Italian Somalia, and French Somalia. The mainly Somali region of Ogaden was 
taken by the Ethiopian Empire and the Northern Frontier District (NFD) by Kenya. These 
borders and the history of Italian and British colonial regimes set the stage for the internal 
conflicts that came later when British and Italian Somalia gained independence in 1960 
(Ambroso, 2002; Menkhaus, 2007). These identities and structures continue to influence 
relationships, power and legitimacy.  
With a current population of approximately 11 million people, the country has 
experienced an extended period without a central government, and is defined by political 
and economic fragmentation since its independence in 1960, when arguably no sense of 
national identity existed (Powell, Ford, & Nowrasten, 2008).6 Somalia lacks a unified 
centralized government. Conflict since the 1980s has been marked by the mostly 
unsuccessful efforts of externally sponsored state-building initiatives. Numerous efforts 
to revive a central state system, including the United Nations Operation in Somalia 
                                                
6 See Appendix A for a more detailed account of the recent history of Somalia than the 
one provided here. 
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(UNOSOM), the Nairobi Peace Accords, have failed. A civil war in the 1980s amidst a 
backdrop of the Cold War has been followed by state collapse, clan factionalism, 
warlordism in the 1990s, and more recently a globalized ideological conflict in the 2000s 
featuring the “war on terror” (Healy & Bradbury, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007).  
The identity alignment of British Somalia and Italian Somalia translates into 
current divisions and conflicts within the country. As of 2015, when this research was 
carried out, the geographic definition of the country included the states (or zones) of 
Somaliland and Puntland, which derive from British Somalia, and South Central, deriving 
from Italian Somalia. Since then South Central has broken up into more states, but for the 
sake of this dissertation I will continue to use these three state definitions. Somaliland is a 
self-declared independent state not recognized by the international community. Puntland 
is a self-declared autonomous state of Somalia. Unlike Somaliland, Puntland does not 
seek independence. The third area, south from the Mudug region and bordering Kenya, is 
referred to as South/Central Somalia, and contains the internationally recognized 
government and country capital, Mogadishu. Somalia’s Human Development Index 
(HDI) value is strikingly low at 0.285, well below the averages for countries in the “low 
human development group” as well as countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (0.475).  
The resilience of the country has been challenged multiple times throughout the 
years, most recently with a severe food crisis hitting in 2017 (World Bank, 2017). Many 
believe Somalia’s economy has been in chaos since the government collapse in 1991 
(Menkhaus, The Crisis in Somalia: Tradegy in Five Acts , 2007; Mubarak, 1997). 
Cyclical challenges have led to a mutation from a pastoral organization to a geographic 
organization of power. Previous to the current drought conditions, the Somali economy 
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was often described by its ability to exist and progress within a context of statelessness. 
Livestock now remains the main export earner and makes significant contribution to the 
GDP in Somalia and Somaliland.  
Primary sectors of the economy include livestock production and export, raw fish 
export, frankincense and animal hides and skins. The Somali coast boasts rich marine 
resources. However, the sector is facing serious challenges such as foreign exploitation, 
resulting in increasing piracy along the coast that has increased insecurity making it 
difficult for Somalis to control their own resources. Frankincense and other gums and 
resins are an important export both in Somaliland and Puntland although the market for 
these products continues to fluctuate and limited value addition is constraining earnings 
from these natural products.  
The more contemporary roots of conflict in Somalia date back to its time of 
independence in 1960, which came with little existing sense of national identity. 
Different monetary systems, languages and styles of government were prevalent, and 
loyalty to one’s clan or village took precedence over that toward state government 
(Powell, Ford, & Nowrasten, 2008). The drivers of violence in Somalia are multiple, 
complex, context-specific, and have religious, ideological, political, economic, and 
historical dimensions. These drivers have also evolved over time: from marginalization 
and identity to alienation, poor governance, and desire for voice.  
Most of Somalia’s conflicts, since the 1980s, have been fought in the name of 
clan affiliation and power struggles. There are five main clan families in Somalia 
including: Darod, Dir, Issaq, Hawiye and Rahanweyn  (Ambroso, 2002). Clanism and 
clan cleavages are a major source for conflict, and are used to divide Somalis, fuel 
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clashes over resources and power, and mobilize militia. Political leaders have been 
known to manipulate clanism for their own purposes, resulting in the majority of armed 
clashes since the 1980s (World Bank, 2005). At the same time, clan leaders have 
historically been at the heart of conflict mitigation efforts. While the central state shows 
potential in being viewed as a source for rule of law, the central state still struggles with 
being seen as an arbitrator of equitable distribution of resources. Economic interests have 
also demonstrated both a positive and negative relationship with conflict. For example in 
some cases, a war economy has emerged perpetuating violence and lawlessness, while in 
other instances private sector interests have been a driving force for peace, stability, and 
the rule of law (World Bank, 2005).  
Change and turbulence continued in the new millennium in Somalia. The years 
2006 through 2008 were marked periods of devastation for Somalia. The country suffered 
military occupation by Ethiopia, a violent insurgency, rising Islamic jihadism, and 
massive population displacement, all of which resulted in a collapse of southern Somalia. 
In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) took control of much of Central and Southern 
Somalia and imposed a strict version of sharia law over the areas it controlled. In 2011, a 
severe drought exacerbated by ongoing civil strife caused thousands to flee to 
neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya, and pushed many Somalis to the brink of starvation. 
During this period Somalia experienced a climate of re-engagement of international 
donors resulting from a post-9/11 concern for Somalia becoming a breeding ground for 
Islamic terrorism. A federal government emerged in 2012 when efforts to restore a 
central authority made progress with the first presidential election since 1967, and the 
swearing-in of the first formal parliament in more than 20 years. A “Somali Compact” 
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was agreed upon by members of the international community. This comprised a two-year 
deal that would increasingly deliver assistance through Somali institutions. In addition, 
pro-government forces made key advances against Al-Shabab.  
Since the formation of the new federal government of Somalia (FGS) in 
September 2012, incremental progress has been made toward democratic governance in 
South Central Somalia. In February 2017, after a peaceful government transition, the 
New Partnership for Somalia was drawn-up. Aligned with the National Development 
Plan (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2016), it outlines priority areas 
critical for development, including a) humanitarian help, b) strengthening national 
security, c) more inclusive and stable politics, and d) accelerating economic recovery. 
However, the relationship with Somaliland and Puntland remains highly complex.  
While armed conflict continues to plague much of Somalia, since 1995 the nature, 
duration, and intensity of warfare have changed significantly. Armed conflicts today are 
more local in nature, pitting subclans against each other in a fragmented political 
environment. Thus armed clashes are shorter in duration and less deadly. Yet new threats 
have arisen related to Al-Shabab and the growth of violent extremism. The impact of 
groups espousing violent ideologies is setting in motion a disappointing reversal of 
development gains (World Bank, 2005). Violent acts related to extremist ideology 
threaten to stunt development prospects for decades to come –and have a specific and 
frightening impact on the education sector. As a result of the activities of Al-Shabab for 
example, Islamic militants recruited large numbers of children from school and abducted 
girls for forced marriage to fighters. Suicide bombings targeting students took a very 
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heavy toll, and schools and universities were used as military bases for fighting (Global 
Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, 2014).  
Against this backdrop lies the basis for my analysis of not only conflict and 
fragmentation, but also current moves towards reintegration and political, social, and 
economic reconstruction. Menkhaus (2007) suggests that the political, economic and 
social history of this land we call Somalia presents an important study in "…the rise of 
informal systems of adaptation, security, and governance in response to the prolonged 
absence of a central government. This development is being driven by the evolving role 
of coalitions of business groups, traditional authorities, and civic groups in promoting 
more ‘organic’ forms of public order and the rule of law  (Menkhaus, 2007 p. 74)". This 
unique context exhibiting resilience, adaptability, and organic forms of public order 
provide the backdrop to this thesis exploring the Somali education system. Within this 
context, in order to forge any meaningful change in policy and planning, it is paramount 
to explore and analyze stakeholder aims, aspirations, powers, and resources that can 
shape a greater unity of purpose and action for the education system of Somalia.   
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Economic and Social Conditions 
Economic and social data are important to understanding the current context of 
the educational sector in Somalia.7 Table 2.4 outlines some of the most important 
economic and social indicators for Somalia. With at least half of the country’s population 
living below the international poverty line of $1.90 a day, many Somali’s are deprived of 
access to basic services: education, healthcare, electricity, sanitation, drinking water, and 
critical commodities. Inequities based on age and gender are striking. More than 70 
percent of the population is under the age of 30, with a life expectancy of 56.5F/53.3M 
years, up from an average of 47 in 2001. The unemployment rate for youth aged 14 to 29 
is 67 percent — one of the highest rates in the world, with females at 74 percent and 
males at 61 percent (UNDP, 2012, p. xix).8  Regarding gender, Somalia ranked as the 
fourth most unequal country in terms of gender relations (UNDP, 2017).  
Somalia’s GDP is $1,375 (million). Its economy is largely dependent on imports, 
which account for two-thirds of the GDP, while exports just 14 percent. Another 
important source of income includes remittances, which are estimated at $1.3 billion a 
year (World Bank, 2017). Data concerning public expenditure shows it steadily 
increasing from $35.1 million in 2012 to $170.5 million in 2016, driven by yearly 
increases in revenue (World Bank, 2017). But emblematic of a state in conflict, 
                                                
7 To avoid biases that frame African nations as "underdeveloped” nations in relation to 
the West and Global North, the more sobering realities of the economic and social 
conditions in Somalia presented in this section must be understood keeping their relation 
to the region’s historical and geo-political context, described earlier, ever-present in the 
background. 
8 Data collected from all three states reflects employment based on local labor force 
definitions.  
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administrative and security sectors account for 90 percent of total public spending, while 
economic and social services account for only about 9 percent. Slow improvements in 
revenue collection resulting from taxes on trade have led to minor increases in domestic 
revenues. Unfortunately, domestic revenue remains inadequate to enable the government 
to deliver public services to Somalis (World Bank, 2017).  
Composition of the Education Sector 
The structure of the current national education system is evolving. Within the last 
two years, the FGS has taken steps to legitimately play a central role in leadership and 
governance of public education for Somalia. This has resulted in nascent newly-formed 
structures: the Ministry of Education provides vision and leadership with a minimum 
representation of a state minister of education, a deputy minister, a permanent secretary, 
and a director general (DG).  
 
Figure 2.2. The Somali Educational Sector 
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The elements of the Somali education system, as shown in Figure 2.2, vary little 
state by state. It has four main levels: pre-primary, primary/alternative, 
secondary/vocational, and higher education. Pre-primary (early childhood) is not yet fully 
integrated into formal education, but in some private facilities and Quranic School 
systems, it exists, running for up to three years. Primary schooling lasts for eight years 
and is divided into a four-year-elementary or lower-primary cycle, and a four-year-
intermediate or upper-primary cycle. Secondary education and Vocational Training, as 
per design, also run for four years. The exception is Arabic medium schools, which have 
9 years of primary/intermediate schooling and 3 years of secondary education. The 
tertiary level for both systems has a minimum of two years, with many running for four. 
The Somali education structure follows a 4-4-4 system, with four years of lower primary, 
four years of upper primary, and four years of secondary school.  
In 2012, Somalia joined the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) as a federal 
state. While each state developed its own sector plan, the ministers and key stakeholder 
leaders came together to analyze the issues and develop five-year education sector plans. 
This resulted in $14.5 million in total funding (GPE, 2016).9 As part of the process, each 
state held a Joint Review of the Education Sector (JRES), which resulted in an annual 
Education Action Plan.  
                                                
9 From 2013-2016 Somalia has received grants totaling $14.5 million, distributed as: $4.2 
for Somaliland, $2.1 for Puntland and $8.2 million for South Central. The three grants are 
supporting the payment of teachers’ salaries or incentives through the respective 
governments. They further support school monitoring by trained employees of the 
Ministry and/or train female teachers (GPE, 2016). 
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Somali Private Education “Umbrellas”.  Although private education networks 
were not included in the stakeholder analysis, their power and influence did figure into 
the findings.  
For the past 25 years, and in the absence of a legitimate education system that can 
deliver free education to the population, private education networks have taken on the 
responsibility of educating millions of Somali children. The weakness of government 
institutions, structures, and a unified policy has catalyzed a flourishing private education 
system to develop across Somalia. There are 12 private education networks that control 
some 817 schools countrywide. Recent reports state that private education employs 8,000 
teachers and another 8,000 staff (Abdullahi & Ahmed, 2015).  
The term "umbrellas” is used for major components of the private educational 
system. The umbrellas consist of seven networks of private education providers, each 
having its own rules and regulations, policy, curriculum, academic year, student uniform, 
education system, and certificate. The umbrellas are: 1. Formal Private Education 
Network in Somalia (FPENS), 2. School Association for Formal Education (SAFE), 3. 
School Organization for Formal Education (SOFE), 4. Somali Formal Education Network 
(SOFEN), 5. Somali Formal Education Link (SOFEL), 6. Formal Education Network for 
Private Schools (FENPS) and 7. Somali Education Development Association (SEDA).   
Debates around centralization and decentralization have permeated education 
sector discussions in developed and developing countries for decades. Simply put, the 
degree of centralization vs. decentralization is defined by the level of authority linked to 
planning and decision-making for the sector. The strength of the government is directly 
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related to whether a country can be successful at meeting the various organizational 
needs of a centralized or decentralized system.  
In recent years, significant effort to streamline education across the country is 
reflected in three accomplishments: 1) the national secondary examinations set by the 
federal Ministry of Education were carried out, with a reported 8,000 students sitting for 
the examinations across the three states, and plans established for children to sit in 
national primary exams next year; 2) the establishment of a nationally owned process to 
develop national and accompanying state curriculum frameworks; and 3) the 
development and endorsement of the Education Bill and additional education policies 
underway by the Ministry of Education, which shows the commitment to strengthen the 
policy and legal framework of the education sector. To put the number of exam-takers in 
context, we can estimate that fewer than three percent of those of graduating age took the 
exams (we can roughly estimate that 360,000 youth are age 17, or graduating age). 
A major milestone was the development and validation of the new curricular 
frameworks at the national and state levels to ensure that “all children have access to 
quality education that will prepare them for a fulfilling a productive role at the 
community, country, region, and global level” (Ministry of Education and Higher 
Education, 2015, p. 4). From these frameworks, the education sector, under the leadership 
of the Federal Ministry of Education, aims to develop unified, standardized, and inclusive 
national curricula for primary and secondary education and provide appropriate teaching 
and learning materials (Ministry of Education and Higher Education, 2015).  
 25 
Summary of Issues in Somali Education 
With limited access and the lack of institutional capacity, there is a paucity of data 
on basic education indicators; both EMIS and MICS (Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey) 
data is dated or incomplete. The EMIS lacks literacy indicators and ceased in 2016 due to 
lack of funding,10 and the MICS11 was conducted in Somaliland and Puntland in 2011, 
but was not nationally representative, lacking data from South Central (last conducted in 
2007). The secondary data review drew from INGO grey literature, the state education 
sector strategic plans (2012-2016), state joint sector education reviews, and 2014 
education census data for Somaliland, Puntland, and Banadir.  
The major issues plaguing Somali education include: out-of-school children, high 
dropout rates, scarcity of qualified teachers, lack of standardization, and prevalence of 
private education – much provided by donors, and data limitations. 
High dropout rates: Alarming primary-level dropout rates exist, with numbers as 
high as 29 percent in the central regions (Ministry of Planning and International 
Cooperation, 2016). The most severe cases were between the first and second grade level, 
where dropout rates were as high as 37 percent in Somaliland, 22.4 percent in Puntland, 
and 60 percent in the South Central and newly liberated areas (Ministry of Planning and 
International Cooperation, 2016). These very high dropout rates at lower primary school 
                                                
10 There is evidence of commitment on the donors part to collect nationally representative 
data, though firm plans have yet to be established. 11	 UNICEF, in close collaboration with the Ministries of Planning and National 
Development in Somaliland and Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation in 
Puntland, successfully implemented the fourth round of Multiple Indicator Cluster 
Survey (MICS) covering more than 9,000 households in the two zones. Data collection 
was started in 2011, and data analysis and drafting of final reports was completed in 
2013.		
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grades demonstrate that a high proportion of the school-age population is comprised of 
dropouts, reflecting both supply and demand issues, and problems with equity (i.e., 
dropout rates varying by geographic location, language group, or gender). On average, 
across the data available, dropout rates were higher among females than males. 
Compounding the issue is the inconsistent or nonexistent data around dropout rates past 
the third grade.  
Scarcity of qualified teachers: In every state in Somalia, there is a severe shortage 
of qualified teachers: 38 percent of teachers in Somaliland are qualified, 62 percent in 
Puntland, and 18 percent in South Central and newly liberated areas (MEHE Department 
of Policy and Planning EMIS Unit, 2015). Moreover, the number of qualified teachers is 
limited due to the lack of systematic teacher training and continuous professional 
development programs.12 Further, most teachers are paid by parents or INGOs, with 
incentives insufficient to retain or attract qualified teachers. 
Lack of standardization. A lack of standards creates inefficiencies and inequities 
in education. The composition of Somali basic education derives from the view of who is 
implementing the service and what system they want to replicate. For example, 
approximately 13 curricula are in use across Somalia. There is a clear lack of uniformity, 
standardization, and harmonization. Above all, this is problematic because children and 
youth lack a national identity – they lack both a common understanding on the hard and 
                                                
12	According to the NDP draft education sector plan (2016), teacher training colleges at 
the federal and state level are desired, and will be based on a baseline survey to document 
the level of training, qualifications, and competencies of school principals and teachers in 
order to establish a competency framework. 
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soft skills in regards to a national history, civic vision, common values, and communal 
skills concerning life, learning, and work. 
Donor Contribution to Education 
Donors and other nonstate actors dominate education provision, yet such funding 
often is short-term, ad-hoc, and unpredictable. Potential excess leverage by external 
actors plagues all public sectors, however, it is especially significant for education, as 
education employs arguably the highest number of civil servants, second only to the 
security sector. Data is not available for all three states, however for Puntland GPE stated 
an ambition to fund education with 7.14 percent of the state budget (Batten, 2015).  
Donor investments in education have been consistently rising over the past five 
years. Table 2.1 provides current education activities of key development partners, 
reflecting more than $260 million identified by key donors to advance education for 
Somali children and youth over the next five years. Donor investments have focused on: 
expanding access through formal and informal service delivery, especially for pastoralist 
populations; strengthening systems for formal primary and secondary education, 
including building capacity in management, data collection, governance, and 
accountability; building the capacity of the teaching force, including teacher recruitment, 
training, payment, and professional development; and providing opportunities and 
pathways for marginalized youth, including technical vocational education and training 
(Somalia Federal Republic, 2013).  
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Table 2.1: Donor Map for Somali Education (Sabul, 2015) 
Donor ~Funding Main focus 
European Union Until 2020 
60m Euro 
 
Construction and equipping primary schools and 
TVET centers, teacher training, development of 
regulatory frameworks, capacity injection and 
systems strengthening 
Location: Somalia 
United States Agency for 
International 
Development  
Until 2017 
30m USD 
Until 2019  
10m USD  
Construction and equipping secondary schools, 
teacher training, youth engagement, violence 
reduction, sector coordination 
Accelerated education for out of school children and 
youth  
Location: South Central  
Qatar Foundation, EAC 
(Education A Child) 
Until 2017 
$25m 
 
Increased access to primary education for out-of-
school children through infrastructural development, 
provision of textbooks and teacher and learning 
materials and teacher training 
Location: Lower Shebelle, Middle Shebelle, Hiiraan 
Global Partnership for 
Education (GPE) 
2013-2016 
$14.5m 
2016-2020 
$33.1m 
Incentives to teachers and regional education 
officers, teacher training and capacity building of 
education institutions 
Location: Somalia 
World Bank Until 2019 
$1m  
(USAID 
funds) 
Strengthen teacher payroll systems, federal education 
service delivery, innovative use of technology for 
data collection and policy advice to promote PPP 
modalities 
Location: Somalia 
DFID Until 2017 
£91.7m 
Scholarships and support to female teacher training, 
access and learning; support to at-risk and out-of-
school girls aged 6-19 
Location: Somalia 
NORAD ~$3m per 
year 
ongoing  
Capacity building, girl education, rehabilitation of 
infrastructure; alternative and accelerated access; 
teacher professional development 
Location: TBC 
GIZ TBC Construction of technical vocational schools, TVET, 
secondary education 
Location: Somaliland, and others TBC 
Italian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and 
International 
Cooperation 
~$2m per 
year 
ongoing  
Supporting Ministry of Education to lead national 
consultation process (Oct. 2016), assisting with SDG 
process for East Africa; TVET  
Location: Somalia 
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School Enrollments and Literacy 
With 30.8 percent of the population of Somalia falling within the age bracket of 
5-14 years, Somalia has over 3.7 million children who are supposed to be in primary 
school (Ministry of Education, Culture and Higher Education, 2016; Global Coalition to 
Protect Education from Attack, 2014), but less than half are enrolled in school, including 
government, nongovernmental and religious schools. Out of all the children and youth in 
both primary and secondary school, the majority resides in Somaliland.  
 
	
 
Figure 2.3: Somalia Primary and Secondary Enrollment by State (EMIS, 2014) 
Enrollment as a percentage of school age children in school is shown in Figure 
2.3. The overall primary school gross enrolment rate (GER) across Somalia as indicated 
by school level data collected in 2011 is 42 percent. Out of this, only 36 percent are girls. 
The figure includes measures of primary and secondary gross enrolment rates (GER) by 
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state, illustrating the relative comparisons, showing Somaliland at the highest rate. While 
the data is skewed for South Central given that the EMIS data only exists for Banadir 
State, the statistics demonstrate that on average more than half the school age population 
is out of school. The statistics are staggering, especially for girls.  
 
Figure 2.4: Somalia Primary and Secondary Gross Enrollment Rates by State 
(EMIS, 2014) 
Regarding secondary schooling, as seen in Figure 2.4, of an estimated population 
of 2 million aged 15-24, only six percent are enrolled in secondary school. Access to 
secondary education is among the worst in the world; the gross enrolment rate (GER) is 8 
percent in 2010, compared to 2 percent in 2003-2004. Only 5 percent of girls and 11 
percent of boys are in secondary schools, indicating a serious gender gap (Ministry of 
Education and Higher Education, 2015). For Technical Vocational Education and 
Training (TVET) and tertiary levels, the gross enrolment rate is even lower at 6.1 percent 
in 2007-2008 (UNESCO 2008). The youth literacy rate for the secondary school-plus age 
group of 14-29 years (not including Koranic schools) is about 48 percent. The rate is 
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higher among males at 53 percent than females at 43 percent. There are more literate 
youth in the urban areas at 55 percent than in rural areas, which is at 33 percent.  
Risk Factors  
The various risks and challenges affecting non-enrollment and dropout in Somalia 
include several interacting factors that are discussed individually below. 
Low Household Income.  The cost of education, mostly from school fees, is too 
great for poor families. Many children, especially in rural areas and among pastoral 
families, work during the day to supplement family income, making school attendance 
difficult (Somalia Federal Republic, 2013).  
Low Quality of Teaching and Learning.  Insufficient numbers of qualified 
teachers, poor school infrastructure, and poor-quality learning materials, which are not 
contextually appropriate, inhibit parents from sending their kids to school. For example 
pupil-teacher ratios for each state are quite high, as illustrated in Figure 2.5.  
 
Figure 2.5: Pupil Classroom Ratio in Somalia, 2014  
(Somalia, 2014; Puntland State of Somalia, 2014; Republic of  
Somaliland, 2014) 
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Insecurity.  Many areas, especially in south and central Somalia, experienced 
conflict and insecurity that forced the displacement of students and teachers. Access by 
international or local organizations is limited to restart education services in some areas.  
Unreliable Teacher Payment System.  Lack of government revenues and a 
transparent teacher payment system result in teachers charging prohibitive school fees to 
offset the lack of a livable wage. GPE investments to Somalia are covering a majority of 
the funds necessary to pay teachers in each state (Batten, 2015).  
Unsafe Learning Environments.  Even where school infrastructure exists, 
internal and external safety risks are pervasive and deter younger students and girls from 
attending. The UN verified 57 attacks on education between 2011-2012. However it is 
estimated that this number is an underestimate given the lack of access to large swaths of 
the country (Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, 2014).  
Inadequate Water and Sanitation (WASH).  There is a lack of separate 
sanitation facilities for boys and girls, significantly deterring young women and girls 
from attending school.  
Cultural Barriers.  Young women and girls face cultural barriers, such as forced 
early marriage, which prevent them from going to school. In some cases, male teachers 
refuse to communicate directly with girls in their classrooms, preventing them from equal 
learning opportunities.  
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Generational Poverty.  Poor rural families with heads of households that have 
little to no education are the least likely to send their children to school and keep them in 
school. 
In Somalia, the majority of international efforts are geared towards increasing 
access and improving quality in primary school. Only a handful of partners are working 
on secondary education, despite the fact that secondary education is associated with 
improved health, economic and social conditions, and civil values. Major donors 
including DfID, the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), and USAID, are addressing 
both supply- and demand-side education challenges around access for secondary-school-
age young people. Recently, the internationally recognized President Hasan Sheikh 
Mahamoud of Somalia was in Washington, DC, for the African Leaders Summit (2014) 
where his one request to the United States Government (USG) was for it to help with 
technical and resource support to improve education outcomes.  
This context provides a rich environment for this study. Recent improvements in 
the stability of the government and subsequent calls by the new prime minister to 
prioritize education above all other sectors provide evidence that education is a major 
development priority and has been identified as a critical strategy for Somali political 
leadership to combat violent extremism and promote peace and security. In few other 
countries is the potential for education to build social cohesion and reduce tensions so 
promising. For Somalia, education has the potential to build peaceful societies and break 
down the fractures between communities and clans. 
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CHAPTER 3   
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY  
Over the past 20 years the world has experienced a shift in the nature of conflict, 
further complicating the study of elements within a conflict context (Buckland, 2005; 
Davies, 2004). This is demonstrated by the fact that a majority of war casualties are 
civilians and result from conflict within – rather than between – countries. Concurrently, 
we see an increase in complex emergencies, which are crises that include both armed 
conflict and natural disasters (World Bank, 2011). We also see regional impacts of cross-
border conflict. An increase in both the threat and realities of international terrorism 
further complicates our understanding of conflict. Somalia provides an important 
example. The conflict in Somalia has been changing over the past 20 years. It has 
evolved from a civil war in the 1980s to state collapse and clan factionalism in the 1990s, 
to globalized ideological conflict in the 2000s (Healy & Bradbury, 2010; World Peace 
Foundation, 2011).  
This chapter provides a literature review of the theory behind one effort to address 
education needs in new conflict-embedded environments, i.e., CSE, its primary tools, and 
stakeholder theory. It also includes a brief conceptual overview for the dissertation. 
A review of the development of the CSE concept aids in understanding how we 
have come to where we are today in its conceptualization, and why certain gaps and 
challenges remain in gathering evidence and making investments and interventions that 
are the most effective. 
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Evolution of Conflict-Sensitivity in Education  
In April 2013, UNESCO’s International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP), 
UNESCO’s Working Group on Education and Fragility, and the International Network 
for Education in Emergencies (INEE) brought together more than 200 education 
stakeholders for a high-level symposium on the challenges of providing quality education 
in conflict-affected and fragile13 contexts. The delegates, including ministers of 
education, ambassadors, and representatives of the Permanent Delegations to UNESCO, 
UN agencies, bilateral organizations, intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
organizations, academia, and civil society organizations, offered concrete 
recommendations to promote the implementation of conflict-sensitive education (INEE, 
2013). 
The right to education is codified in article 13 and 14 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948), the UNESCO Convention Against 
Discrimination in Education (UNESCO, 1960), and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (UN General Assembly, 1966). During the refugee 
crises of the 1980s (Afghanistan, Rwanda) and 1990s (Afghanistan, Balkans, Uganda, 
Great Lakes Crisis), the international community was challenged with operationalizing 
the right to education through increased advocacy on and upholding access to education 
for the growing number of displaced populations. In the 1980s and 1990s, education-
related responses to conflict contexts focused on ideas framed around “education as a 
                                                
13 While the discourse of ‘fragility" appears in the literature of international development 
referenced below, and has been applied in scholarship related to CSE (for example, see 
Pswarayi & Reeler, 2012 in the case of Zimbabwe), with Møller (2009), who applies a 
critical lens to such discourse and associated programs, I approach it guardedly, and in 
general favor the conflict-and-crisis-impacted (CCI) term I have offered in its place.  
 36 
right” as a justification for ensuring education during times when it is typically disrupted 
or unfunded. This logic is based on distinguishing education as a form of protection: 
restoring hope and normality. By the late 90s, the education as a right argument expanded 
to include consideration of physical, emotional, and cognitive protection during 
emergencies and crises (Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003; Sinclair, 2001).  
Yet debates ensued about the proper way to respond to the changing nature of 
conflict in light of the ongoing devastating effects of CCI environments. Key 
developments contributed to the visibility of this critical debate within international 
development circles. First, for the international development community, the clock was 
ticking on the deadline to achieve Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the 
Education for All agenda, which called for universal primary education by 2015. There 
were some key achievements, including: an increase in the primary school net enrolment 
in the developing world from 83 percent in 2000 to 91 percent in 2015, as well as a 
nearly 50 percent decrease in the number of out-of-school children or primary school age 
globally, from 100 million in 2000 to around 57 million. There were noteworthy 
improvements in primary education in Sub-Saharan Africa, which witnessed a net 
enrolment rate increase from 8 percent in the period between 1990 and 2000 to 20 
percent in the period between 2000 and 2015; and a global increase in the literacy rate 
among youth aged 15 to 24, from 83 percent in 1990 to 91 percent in 2015 (MDG 
Monitor, 2017).  
At the same time, evidence in the 2011 Global Monitoring Report showed that, 
while the access gap was closing, it was not closing fast enough for children and youth 
affected by conflict. In 2011, 57 million children remained out of primary school 
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worldwide, with estimates that at least 42 percent of that total lives in conflict-affected 
countries (UNESCO, 2011). Furthermore, in countries affected by conflict, the number of 
out-of-school children increased from 30 percent to 36 percent between 1999 and 2012 
(MDG Monitor, 2017). More recent calculations done by Education Cannot Wait (ECW) 
cite a total of 75 million school-aged children and youth between the ages of 3 and 18 are 
in desperate need of educational support, either in danger of, or already missing out on 
their education (Nicolai, et al., 2016, p. 10). 
As a result, the global education community agreed on ensuring that the next 
iteration of MDGs for education included improvements in both access and learning. This 
is demonstrated by the work of the Brookings Institution’s Learning Metrics Task Force 
(LMTF) and its discussions on the post-2015 agenda for education, led by key education 
donors and research institutions, including the UK Department for International 
Development (DfID), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the 
Brookings Institution, and the Global Partnership for Education (GPE). Their Sustainable 
Development Goal (SDG) for education called for nations to "Ensure inclusive and 
quality education for all and promote lifelong learning."  
Yet by the late 2000s, disturbingly overwhelming evidence was building on the 
ways in which education actually can contribute to both state and global tensions. When 
education increases social tensions or division, it has the potential to create grievances 
that lead to conflict. For example, when children from one ethnic group exhibit lower 
enrollment rates than others, or when history textbook content in schools favors the 
narratives of a given dominant group, this can increase tensions and produce grievances 
that may contribute to conflict. This was observed in examples from Afghanistan, Bosnia 
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and Herzegovina, Rwanda, and the Sudan (Gaigals & Leonhardt, 2001; INEE, 2013; 
Smith, 2005). In many conflicts around the world, schools and education systems have 
actively reinforced social, ethnic, and religious division, creating fertile soil for the 
propagation of attitudes and beliefs that promote exclusion, and in the worst cases lead to 
violence (UNESCO, 2011). These changes reflect in part the changing nature of conflict 
(Davies, 2004; World Bank, 2011). Where previously wars were fought on battlefields, 
increasingly civilians are victims of war, with lives seriously impacted by the 
consequenses of war and crisis. Globally we see repeated cycles of political and criminal 
violence, resulting in the acceleration of violence related to gangs and criminal activity. 
The recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provide examples of the necessesity of 
integrating security and development more effectively.  
Principles and Application of Conflict Sensitivity Education 
Conflict-sensitivity theory advocates diagnosing elements that foment and 
escalate violence, and then taking actions to remedy them. CSE encompasses action at 
two fundamental levels of policy and practice: a) policies, activities, and approaches that 
promote equitable access to educational opportunity; and b) curricula and pedagogy that 
include content that builds knowledge, skills, and values supportive of peace and social 
cohesion. A minimum requirement to being conflict sensitive is " do-no-harm." This 
requires always keeping in mind the impact of education assistance on conflict. Echoing 
the words of the Hippocratic oath, Mary Anderson’s do-no-harm challenges aid agency 
staff to take responsibility for the ways that their assistance affects conflicts and 
development (1999). 
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According to early supporters, a do-no-harm approach to education in conflict and 
CCI contexts requires making all decisions with an awareness of how actions, programs, 
and policies could affect power relations and intergroup relations that may contribute to 
conflict. For example, it is important to make sure that new programs exhibit neutrality 
and do not inadvertently exacerbate existing points of tension through language of 
instruction, teacher recruitment, or location of schools (Anderson, 1999; Buckland, 2005; 
Bush & Sarterelli, 2000). Assessing these factors can be contentious, and there are no 
existing criteria for what constitutes biased or potentially harmful decisions. Good 
practice for incorporating do-no-harm in education points towards intentional 
engagement of influential actors on multiple sides of a conflict. Mary Anderson cites the 
experiences of many aid providers in CCI contexts to show that international aid – even 
when it is effective in saving lives, alleviating suffering, and furthering sustainable 
development – too often reinforces divisions among opposing groups (Anderson, 1999). 
But Anderson more importantly offers hopeful evidence of creative programs that point 
the way to new approaches to aid. Calling for a redesign of assistance programs so that 
they do-no-harm while doing their intended good, she argues further that many 
opportunities exist for aid workers to in fact support the processes by which societies 
disengage from war. 
In the first part of this century, the Paris Declaration (2005), and then later the 
New Deal for Aid Effectiveness in Fragile States (2011), represent attempts to 
demonstrate global recognition of both the failures of aid, and the critical need to 
harmonize donor approaches and promote the leadership and vision of host countries in 
their own development. The Paris Declaration was a result of the Paris High Level Forum 
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on Aid Effectiveness, which drew the international community together in February 2005 
to discuss the role of aid in promoting development, a topic that was attracting increasing 
public scrutiny, and which has direct implications for education. While some progress 
had been made in harmonizing the work of international aid donors in developing 
countries, it was acknowledged that much more needed to be done. The aid process was 
still too strongly led by donor priorities and administered through donor channels, 
making it hard for developing countries to take the lead. Aid was still too uncoordinated, 
unpredictable, and opaque. Deeper reform was felt to be essential if aid was to 
demonstrate its true potential in the effort to overcome poverty. The Paris Declaration 
goes much further than previous agreements; at its heart is the commitment to help 
developing-country governments formulate and implement their own national 
development plans according to their own national priorities using, wherever possible, 
their own planning and implementation systems. Emerging from the Paris Declaration, 
the New Deal for Aid Effectiveness in Fragile States identifies five peacebuilding and 
state-building goals: legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and 
revenues and services as "an important foundation to enable progress towards the MDGs" 
(2011).  
Neo-Colonialism and Aid  
Neo-colonial legacies determine societal and state conditions in most of Africa. 
This legacy also has some relevance in the context of CSE and Somalia.  
The term Neo-colonialism, coined by Kwame Nkruma in 1963, refers to the 
control of ‘less developed’ countries by western countries in the post-colonial period 
using capitalism, globalization and cultural imperialism as well as the continuing 
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dependence of former colonies on foreign countries (Sartre, 2001). In order to understand 
the term and its relationship to international aid, one must first go back to 1878, the 
Berlin Conference and the scramble for Africa when white colonial powers came together 
and tried to settle their own disagreements over the distribution of possessions in Africa. 
No African was at the table. It is here we see the creation of colonial empires in Africa. 
The aim was to serve the interest of colonial powers and make sure these powers did not 
come into conflict with each other.  
However, the creation of artificial political entities cutting right through existing 
communities with little recognition of cultural, linguistic or ethnic realities led to later 
conflicts on the continent, among other challenges. The colonial enterprise was focused 
on re-defining boundaries, extracting resources, and creating the minimum degree of 
indigenous order in places like Zaire, Zambia, and Burkina Faso, to name a few. Ngugi 
referred to this as an instrumental order intended not for the benefit of the colonized 
(1993). When considering this, the argument stands that racism is not accidental, rather 
an ideology of control.  
The concept can be linked to Western aid with the goals of poverty reduction, 
economic growth, and social development. At the time of independence and de-
colonization many countries were left underdeveloped, struggling with corruption, and 
with weak political institutions. During the 1970’s sub-Saharan Africa experienced neo-
liberal capitalism most notably through the IMF Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) 
or loan policies. These required the predominately socialist, newly independent African 
countries to cut back on public service spending, which critically affected education and 
health. In some cases, the policies also required radically privatizing public services, 
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which lead to high devaluations and resulted in further weakening economies. This use of 
aid as an instrument of power translated into current policies. This can be illustrated in 
the way in which Western donor aid is often used as a subsidy for foreign corporate 
involvement in Africa, despite dubious returns for the poorer citizenry in developing 
countries (Langan, 2017). Following this critical view, donor support, in terms of both 
financial and technical aid could pose a genuine obstacle to sovereignty in African 
countries. One could extrapolate from this that the concept and application of CSE falls 
under this critique as well.  
With this critique in mind, I would argue this study provides a middle ground. 
The application of stakeholder analysis to what one might consider a “Western” concept 
(i.e. CSE) provides a valid pathway in the contextualization of both the elements of CSE 
for Somalia and how to take a national approach to the potential actions that would 
improve education quality, equity, and policy from the ground-up by tapping into local 
knowledge, values, and priorities. This process expands the voice and legitimacy of the 
Somali actors included in the research.  
Conceptual Framework for the Study 
The framework for my research is explained in Figure 3.1. This framework 
theorizes that the reform of the education system in Somalia towards greater justice by 
reducing inequalities requires (among other requirements for education sector reform):  
• The identification and analysis of key stakeholders, their characteristics, and 
how they may resist or facilitate these reforms,   
• Raising the awareness and sensitivity of key stakeholders about the linkage 
between inequality and social conflict (CSE).  
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 This approach questions the existing notion that, by merely increasing awareness, 
sensitivity will be increased. Awareness does not always lead to action, and in many 
instances, key stakeholders believe that inequality and bias are justified. Key CSE issues 
and key stakeholders must first be identified, and this proceeds through an iterative 
process that increases the awareness of those involved about how a particular education 
system may be biased, exclusionary, and inequitable, including how their own beliefs 
about the system are implicated. Resisters and facilitators, and the mechanisms behind 
them, are identified. Beyond this, however, findings can be utilized to develop a road 
map for what changes are possible in the way governance, policies, and programs are 
carried out. Thus the process has the potential to eventually lead past mere awareness to 
some measure of reduction in conflict, oppression, inequity, and injustice in the system, 
which can ultimately result in improved education outcomes, specifically in access and 
learning.  
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Figure 3.1: Conceptual and Procedural Framework 
The diagram in Figure 3.1 charts the steps within my conceptual framework that 
have the most potential to lead to CSE. The four steps represent my unique application of 
stakeholder analysis to contribute to CSE in Somalia.  
Addressing the starting point of the framework tied to bias and exclusion – which 
can take the form of partisanship, self-interest, and more active and violent forms of bias 
that can impede or deny education – leads to an deeper exploration of the concept of the 
“dual faces” of education. This concept recognizes that, just as an educational system can 
promote peace, inclusiveness, and stability through its structures and content, it also can 
entrench existing inequalities and prejudices, and can lead to fostering conflict. For 
example, in Afghanistan in the 1980s, textbooks were printed and distributed with violent 
content fomenting hatred and violence, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the mid-
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1990s, ethnic tensions were engendered by fragmented education provision based on 
ethnic identity (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; Smith & Vaux, 2003). In contentious settings, 
social service delivery, including education, has been used as an instrument to reward or 
punish certain groups or factions in a conflict. For example, before South Sudan gained 
independence, the Sudanese government starved the South with very limited resources 
for education. In contexts like this, when social services are lacking or provided 
inequitably, the resulting void or imbalance can result in grievances that drive conflict. 
By providing equitable and consistent basic social services to a population emerging from 
crisis, the government begins to regain the trust of the population, which signals the 
return to normal life. The population regains confidence in the system. Following this 
logic, in order for education to be conflict-sensitive, conflict-sensitive sector governance 
must be supported. Building bias-free systems for local governance and accompanying 
efforts to decentralize public administration and service delivery is key. This includes 
building state capacities at the local level for decentralized service delivery in ways that 
strive to meet inclusive and government-supported priorities (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; 
Smith & Vaux, 2003).  
Schools can be targeted in conflict and post-conflict settings in ways that 
perpetuate both physical and structural sources of violence. Education policy has not 
been sufficiently part of the peacebuilding agenda, yet such policy reforms can influence 
public perceptions. Despite growing recognition of these issues, a robust analysis of 
conflict rarely drives post-conflict programming efforts or mitigates long-standing 
grievances that underpin conflict. Policy reforms in the areas of language of instruction 
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and curriculum will require strengthened national planning with attention to principles of 
inclusivity and conflict assessment. 
Conventional Application of CSE Tools  
The CSE Toolkit summarized in Table 3.1, includes three main structured 
instruments that are central to the current definition, understanding, and application of the 
CSE construct to education. Each of these tools, developed and offered by international 
organizations, maps out normative standards on how to implement CSE.  
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Table 3.1: Traditional CSE Tools  
Tool Purpose Audience  Features  
Conflict 
Sensitivity in 
Education 
Pack (INEE) 
To inform government, 
development and 
humanitarian workers on the 
design and delivery of 
education programs and 
policies in a way that 
considers the conflict context 
and aims to minimize the 
negative impact (contribution 
to conflict) and maximize 
positive impact (contribution 
to peace). 
 
This guidance 
note is for 
education 
practitioners and 
policy makers 
working in 
conflict-affected 
and fragile 
contexts.  
Guidance note 
Guiding principles 
Reflection Tool  
Checklist for 
Conflict-
Sensitivity in 
Education 
Programs 
(USAID)  
 
To assist USAID education 
programs in effectively and 
efficiently meeting the 
USAID Education Strategy: 
Increase equitable access to 
education in conflict and crisis 
environments. Applying 
conflict-sensitivity to program 
design, implementation, and 
monitoring will improve 
education programs by 
making them more equitable, 
effective, efficient, and 
sustainable. 
USAID Education 
Staff.  
Policy makers.  
Government 
Actors.  
Checklist format.  
Offers a practical 
framework for 
analyzing the 
operational and 
technical aspects of 
education 
programs. This 
ensures the 
reduction of 
conflict and 
tensions, which 
promotes equity 
and social cohesion 
and builds peace. 
A preliminary 
review of 
conflict-
sensitive 
education 
policy 
(UNESCO)  
To share international 
experience on how education 
policies may contribute to 
continuing tensions and 
conflict, or help reduce these 
tensions. Suggests that all 
education programming 
should be adapted to help 
reduce tensions that may lead 
to conflict; and that special 
programs should be envisaged 
to help build peace 
Ministries of 
Education.  
Government 
actors. 
Donor agencies.  
Book format.  
Makes the case for 
CSE.  
Zeroes in on policy 
and planning.  
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The first instrument, INEE’s Conflict Sensitivity in Education Pack (2013), targets 
education practitioners and policy makers working in conflict-affected and fragile 
contexts. This resource, developed through a consultative and coordinated process by the 
INEE Working Group on Education and Fragility, presents tools aimed at assisting policy 
makers, donors, and practitioners to integrate conflict-sensitivity into programs and 
policies. The CSE Pack includes three key tools: 1) the INEE Guidance Note on Conflict-
Sensitive Education, which introduces key concepts related to CSE programming and 
describes strategies to implement conflict-sensitive programs and policies that are 
harmonized with the INEE Minimum Standards for Education; 2) the Diagnostic 
Programme Tool for Conflict Sensitive Education; and 3) the Guiding Principles to 
Integrate Conflict Sensitivity in Education Policies and Programming. This pack serves 
as an introduction to the basic concepts and key principles that underpin CSE. The 
resource advises users to start with assessment, prioritize "do-no-harm" and prevention, 
and promote equity and the holistic development of the child. Then the resource 
prioritizes stabilizing or building the education system, and concludes with a call for 
development partners to act fast and adapt to the changing environment. The guidance 
note, aimed at education practitioners and policy makers, serves as a companion to the 
INEE Minimum Standards Handbook (2010).  
Education Above All’s A Preliminary Review of Conflict-sensitive Education 
Policy (Sigsgaard, 2012) builds on INEE’s tools and elaborates more specific guidance 
for policy makers. It details definitions of key concepts, builds the case for the 
importance of enacting conflict-sensitive education policies, and then focuses on specific 
steps for the development of conflict-sensitive education policies from the viewpoint of 
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education ministries and donor institutions. These are broken down into five key areas 
which include: mobilizing political will and capacity, promoting equitable access at all 
levels of education, making curriculum, teaching and language conflict sensitive, 
strengthening emergency preparedness to protect education from attack, and exploring 
context-specific issues.  
Finally, the most practical of the tools, USAID’s Checklist for Conflict-Sensitivity 
in Education Programs (USAID, 2013), is organized around several aspects of the 
education system: commitment and accountability, strategy, procurement and data, 
equitable access, curricula teaching and learning, capacity building, community 
engagement, information management systems, and monitoring and evaluation. The 
Checklist offers a practical framework for analyzing the operational and technical aspects 
of education programs. It is intended to promote the reduction of conflict and tensions, 
which promotes equity and social cohesion and builds peace. The tool scores the level of 
conflict-sensitivity of the education sector or program being evaluated.  
These tools provide normative frameworks and definitions around CSE, drill 
down into specific characteristics within the education system that can aid in the analysis 
of the level of conflict-sensitivity in the system, and offer conflict analysis and a mapping 
of the capacity and will of actors and groups. However, they fail to address in any 
substantial way the fundamental role of identifying key stakeholders and their explicit 
and implicit interests related to the education system, and how these interests may 
engender bias, injustice, violence or inequity, and the ways in which these interests 
directly impact the viability of the policies or programs intended to make education more 
conflict-sensitive. It is with the recognition of the weakness of these tools that we 
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propose stakeholder analysis – which is defined, integrated, and modeled in this study – 
as an important and effective strategy to improve the operationalization of CSE and the 
likelihood for its successful implementation, and we do so using Somalia as a case study.  
A Focus on Stakeholders 
A literature review of stakeholder analysis provides key pieces from business 
management, environmental/natural resource management, and organizational 
development fields. While no systematic reviews of research on stakeholder analysis 
exist specifically for CSE, several key pieces help to define the theory, framework, and 
process for use,  and to explain its benefits and challenges.  
Background.  Originating in part from the field of business management, 
stakeholder analysis represents a process of systematically gathering and analyzing 
qualitative and quantitative information to gauge whose interests should be taken into 
account, and how those interests can shape the planning and implementation of policy 
during the planning process. Stakeholder analysis provide a framework to examine and 
analyze various stakeholders’ interests and influence, the interrelations between groups 
and organizations, and their impacts on policy.  
Originally introduced by Freeman (1984), stakeholder analysis is further 
elaborated on by Mitchell (1997), Bryson (2004, 2011), and Williams and Duncan (2008) 
as an important policy step to better understand modern strategic challenges in private 
and public sectors. Bryson concluded that Freeman’s stakeholder model was an important 
strategic planning approach with high potential for government organizations and 
communities alike. A critical caveat is that this approach will only succeed if agreement 
is possible among key decision makers over who the stakeholders are and what the 
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organization’s responses to them should be (Bryson et al., 1986; Bryson & Roering, 
1987: pp. 12–13). 
Utilization. In the public sector, increasing attention is paid to reasons why policy 
reforms are not being carried out. For example, many cases can be presented for what 
seem to be promising and progressive policy reforms, for example, the Somalia National 
Development Plan (NDP) and its mission for the education system. Yet many are not 
carried out. Barriers to implementing these policies include the lack of political will to 
enforce them and conflicts among key government officials or community leaders, as 
witnessed in Sub-Saharan Africa (Manji, 2001).  
Freeman (1984) originally defined three main "canons" or levels for stakeholder 
analysis, including the rational, the processual14, and the transactional. Rational 
stakeholder mapping represents the first step in stakeholder identification. This includes 
techniques to develop a standard stakeholder map that is then used to classify 
stakeholders according to their origins and relationships. Then, to gain more insights, 
stakeholders are further mapped according to their interests and the resources they offer 
through these interests (Grimble & Wellard, 1997). Bryson further elaborated on this as 
an important step in ensuring ethical considerations in the design of evaluations (2011). 
As methods evolved through modern practice, Nwankwo and Richardson (1996) came to 
argue that stakeholder mapping goes beyond the mere construction of a rational 
stakeholder map.  
                                                
14 Freeman coined this term, and based on his work this refers to procedural elements.  
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The processual level per se is problematic for CSE because it is conceived as a 
corporate-centric approach. It is principally concerned with "the firm" or corporate entity 
as the central focus, as opposed to the needs and values of the stakeholder. It is only 
concerned with stakeholders in as much as they are contributing to the strength of the 
firm or corporation, so it is less applicable in the public-sector domain (K’Akumu, 2016). 
For example, this level is critiqued for the way it calls for plotting stakeholder positions 
in relationship to the firm, or to a single issue related to the firm (Nwandkwo & 
Richardson, 1996).  
Finally, the transactional level involves a set of relationships that managers in 
organizations have with stakeholders. This level can also be seen as an approach by 
which companies effectively implement the transactional level of strategic management 
capability (Freeman, 1984). This involves answering questions such as: How do the 
organizations and its managers interact with stakeholders?  
Identifying stakeholders: Who are stakeholders? Bryson defines stakeholders as 
"persons, groups, or organizations that must somehow be taken into account by leaders, 
managers and front-line staff" (2004, p. 23). Yet this definition fails to elaborate on why 
stakeholders must be taken into account (K’Akumu, 2016). More specifically for public-
sector analysis, stakeholders are individuals, groups, or organizations (actors) with a 
vested interest in the policy being promoted, who are affected by the issue, or who – 
because of their position – have or could have an active or passive influence on decision 
making and outcomes. The theory of stakeholder identification highlights three key 
attributes of stakeholders: the power to influence, legitimacy in relation to the policy or 
issue being analyzed, and the urgency of the stakeholder’s claim on the policy or issue 
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(Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). In order to be a stakeholder worthy of attention, at least 
two of these three attributes should be present. ODA further breaks stakeholders into 
primary and secondary groups (Overseas Development Administration, 1995).  
Applying Stakeholder Analysis to CSE 
Through this research I explored whether the current practices and related tools 
aimed at raising awareness and sensitivity among key stakeholders within national 
education systems – as a policy and program – actually have a positive impact on the 
"systemic" relationships across the conflict-education-interface. Does this lead to the 
appropriate changes in policy and practice? How can the identification and recognition of 
key actors with power, legitimacy, and influence improve the operationalization of this 
construct, ultimately leading to a more equitable and just education system? I argue that it 
is not enough to raise awareness in order to achieve equity and justice within an 
education system. This analysis will ultimately assist in the assessment of the feasibility 
of future conflict-sensitive policy and practice decisions.  
Davies (2005) provides a concise listing of the links between conflict and 
education available for analysis, including a) the embeddedness of schooling in the roots 
of conflict, entailing factors like inequality and ethnic and gendered violence b) the direct 
effects of violence on education itself, c) consideration of the reverse direction, i.e., the 
impact of school curricula and organization on conflict, d) post-conflict responses, and e) 
visions for a future beyond conflict. (p. 631). 
While this account helps make visible the dynamics of a CCI context, at its heart 
are actors that bring it about and are impacted by its consequences. As K’Akumu (2016) 
puts it within the context of land reform in Kenya, “stakeholders matter in the reform 
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process, ” (p. 16), which makes the determination of key stakeholders a fundamental first 
order of business.  
This is particularly important for efforts to promote CSE and more equitable 
education in Somalia for several reasons. A major assumption within the traditional CSE 
construct is that key decision makers (stakeholders) will respond to an increase in 
awareness and sensitivity on education governance by taking action for positive change, 
which will reduce conflict, oppression, and inequity in the education system, thus 
promoting equity and justice in the community and resulting in increased access and 
improved learning outcomes (Clarke-Habibi, 2005). The underlying hypothesis is that by 
working toward conflict-sensitivity, actors will be more inclusive, and thus both access 
and learning will improve. Additionally, the likelihood of societal or community 
grievances will be lowered, thus improving social cohesion.  
The concept and methodology of stakeholder analysis is proposed here as an 
important holistic and integrated framework to determine the level of awareness, the key 
influencers and resisters to progress, and how to develop a realistic action plan for 
incremental change with respect to CSE. It is provided as an essential approach to 
understanding and shaping policy for education in crisis and conflict-affected settings. It 
is particularly useful in a context like Somalia with a history of warring factions, group 
distrust, and clan enmity by providing an important framework for weighing and 
balancing competing demands.  
Appropriateness of Focusing on Stakeholder Analysis. While stakeholder 
analysis is not a silver bullet for achieving behavior change related to policy reforms, it 
offers an important tool and shows much promise in both surfacing and resolving some of 
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the barriers to stakeholder action. On one hand, we cannot afford to have one expert 
come in and say "this is what the change means." On the other hand, we also recognize 
the larger-scale assessments that school systems often rely on are not a good choice in 
many situations because they do not provide context-specific guidance, or give timely 
enough feedback. There are a number of tools and techniques for assessment, and 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) approaches that have been recently developed to fill 
this need. These techniques need to be nimble, credible, and insightful. But it is easy to 
mistakenly get a nimble, insightful method that it not credible, or a credible, insightful 
method that is not nimble (Guijt, 2007; Patton, 2011; Valters, 2015).  
Discussing the chronology and evolution of the field of education in conflict and 
crisis environments aids in understanding how we have come to see that a problem exists 
in the current conceptualization of CSE. While the current discourse is successful in 
describing the impact of conflict on education, and in defining the problems of education 
in conflic,15 and giving normative advice on what to do to address those problems under 
the auspices of CSE,16 it is important to recognize that inherent in CSE is the need to first 
make sense of the status quo and then to influencing social change. Operationalizing 
conflict-sensitive education relies on individuals taking action through both policies and 
behavior (Guijt, 2007). A group of M&E experts has been exploring and documenting the 
importance of utilizing assessment and learning to strengthen social change (Guijt, 2007). 
It is apparent that policy makers and practitioners are reluctant to look at power issues, 
                                                
15	For example, bias, exclusion, low quality, and insecurity. 
16 For example, conduct conflict analysis, consider proximity of schools to homes, review 
curricula for violence and bias, and provide training for teacher to improve social-
emotional learning.	
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individual relationships, and hidden economic interest. Yet addressing these are critical 
for effective sustained change (Berghof Foundation, 2011; Bush, 1998) and recognizing 
the “negative” face of education in CCI environments. 
Bearing the above in mind, the appropriateness of focusing on exploring an 
expansion of the concept and techniques associated with stakeholder analysis for this 
study in CSE in Somalia may be summarized as follows: 
• the fundamental role of stakeholder identification and analysis as the first order of 
business in understanding the dynamics of the education-conflict interface. 
• the inattention generally provided thus far in the literature to exploring issues of 
inequality and various forms of identity and culturally-based bias in stakeholder 
analysis theory behind its historical roots in profit-oriented management theory. 
This leads to a wider scope of consideration of who may be considered a 
stakeholder, or what is at stake. 
• the timeliness of reconceptualizing stakeholder analysis in a contemporary 
context involving new forms of conflict, global migrations, impactful non-state 
actors, and even factors like climate change that contribute to a conflict and crisis-
impacted environment in an increasingly interconnected world (Bryson, 2004; 
Zajda, 2005). 
• my own professional experience which has uniquely facilitated the kind of wide-
ranging access to diverse sets of stakeholders required for this type of project. 
and finally lastly, and maybe most crucially,  
• the particular set of multiple, complexly-interacting actors/stakeholders that 
function in Somalia today, a country with a history of hosting a wide range of 
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domestic and external actors and interests, which have often been self-serving 
actors and interests– a land that as a consequence has extraordinary needs for its 
CCI-embedded educational sector. 
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CHAPTER 4   
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents the methodology and procedures I used to gather data for 
my study in three key phases: determining CSE issue(s), analysis of constraints and 
opportunities, and strategy and action planning for the Somali case.  
This research relied on a case study of the conflict-embedded Somali education 
sector, and was primarily qualitative in nature. It used a combination of tools that provide 
a systematic analysis of the stakeholders with a vested interest in education in Somalia. 
Data collection methods included preliminary research of the literature, two workshops, 
face-to-face interviews using checklists, semi-structured interviews using interview 
guides, focus group discussions, and self-administered questionnaires.  
The first step in the research was defining the CSE problem or issue in Somalia. 
This began with preliminary research of secondary sources. Using a qualitative research 
design, I then identified a targeted list of key informants drawn from my own contacts 
with donors, implementing partners, government, and multilaterals who could provide 
expert opinion on identifying the predominant CSE issues for Somalia, as well as ideas 
on stakeholder identification,  including consideration of their own affiliated 
organization, for potential inclusion as a stakeholder. From that initial group, through 
snowballing and referrals, I identified additional candidate stakeholder candidates in civil 
society.  
Furthermore, I sought to understand key characteristics and perspectives of these 
candidate stakeholders, specifically to uncover their influence on decision-making and 
behavioral change related to education in Somalia to help confirm their classification as 
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stakeholders. To this end, I used purposeful sampling to invite 25 key informants from 
national and central government, donor agencies, civil society, and higher education 
institutions to a set of meetings. After data collection, from November of 2015 to 
November of 2016, I analyzed the data, starting with recording and then transcribing 
interviews, transfering data from analysis tables, and collating survey responses. Interim 
data tables were drawn out with definitions of stakeholder characteristics, including a 
power index, and a spectrum for positions related to the issue. The final step was utilizing 
these interim data tables and scores to conclude who the important stakeholders were, 
their knowledge of CSE, their priorities, their position on CSE, and which stakeholders 
might form alliances. I also outline limitations and ethical considerations, and describe 
how I position myself as the analyst. 
Research Methodology   
 The procedural framwork of my qualitative study reflects five critical steps I 
adapted from INEE’s guidelines for effective CSE analysis in education (INEE, 2013)17. 
These steps derive from a general CSE framework, which is defined by the process of:  
understanding the context in which education takes place, analyzing the two-way 
interaction between the context and education programs and policies (development, 
planning, and delivery); and acting to minimize negative impacts and maximize positive 
impacts of education policies and programming on conflict, within an organization’s 
given priorities (INEE, 2013). These guidelines were applied to form the following three 
main elements of the research methodology for the Somali case: 
                                                
17 INEE developed these tools by adapting the broad tools and literature related conflict-
sensitivity into education-specific guidance (INEE, 2013).	
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• Identify the main CSE issues in Somalia, taking into account the particular 
Somali historical, economic, political, and socio-cultural context. 
• Identify CSE stakeholders in Somalia, and assess stakeholder characteristics, 
including giving attention to identifying elements that act as resisters and 
facilitators 
• Utilize findings to establish a roadmap for furture research and more effective 
CSE integration.  
Three key phases for stakeholder analysis are detailed below in Table 4.1, with 
expected outputs for each phase detailed.  
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Table 4.1: Stakeholder Analysis Phases  
Phase Steps Output 
1. Determine the CSE 
issue(s)  
• Appraise objectives 
• Identify and convene 
relevant actors 
• Identify diversity and 
commonality of missions  
• Define the education 
system/environment  
• Clarify and (re)define the 
problem  
• Identification of CSE 
problems/issues 
• Identification of key 
stakeholders  
• Identification of interests of 
stakeholders  
2. Analysis of 
Stakeholder 
Characteristics 
(including constraints 
and opportunities)  
• Identify relations 
between stakeholders  
• Assess assumptions and 
risks about stakeholders  
• Assess which 
stakeholders are 
important for success  
• Variables affecting 
stakeholders relative power 
and influence  
• Identification of key 
stakeholders’ assumptions  
• Classification of 
stakeholders according to 
influence on and 
importance to project/ 
policy/issue  
3. Strategy and Action 
Planning. Develop 
findings for future 
research toward 
effective CSE 
Integration 
Assess the appropriate type of 
participation by stakeholders 
 
Develop recommendations and 
strategies that work to 
systematically engage stakeholders 
for improved policy action and 
CSE  
 
Determine CSE Issues 
The goal for this research was to produce rich descriptions rather than focus on 
the measurement of specific variables, although well-developed descriptions did require 
some data measures. The data used was primarily qualitative, and therefore analysis 
focuses on meaning rather than quantifiable results. Sampling of respondents was done 
purposively in an effort to reach a select number of knowledgable informants within each 
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stakeholder group/strata. As such, the fieldwork focused on collecting a large amount of 
data from a small number of respondents.  
Tools Used for Data Collection  
This research phase employed several main research tools that acted as guides for 
investigation. These are described in Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2: Research Tools  
 Tool Purpose 
1 Workshop Agenda and 
Facilitation Guide (x2)  
Understand and engage with different actors 
through reflection, assessment and learning.  
Utilize learning as a key process of ongoing 
reflection about visions, strategies and actions 
that enable continual readjustment (Guijt, 2007).  
Recognize the special features of education 
processes and accommodate them in research 
instruments. 
2 USAID’s Checklist for Conflict 
Sensitivity in Education  
Identify the main purpose of the analysis.  
Develop an understanding of the system and 
decision makers.  
Identify key CSE issues/problems/opportunities 
for Somalia. 
3 Stakeholder Identification Semi-
Structured Interview Guide  
Identify principle stakeholders.  
4 
 
Protocol for drawing out CSE 
issues related to Education Sector 
Assessment (ESA), as well as 
interests, importance, assumptions 
 
Investigate stakeholder interests, characteristics, 
and circumstances related to the ESA and CSE.  
Identify patterns and contexts of interaction 
between stakeholders.  
Identify assumptions and risks deriving from 
stakeholders.  
Identify how CSE might inform the ESA. 
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Initial Research to Identify Key CSE Issues of Concern 
I gathered and analyzed published and unpublished documents, reports, policy 
statements, internal regulations of groups, and related training and curricular material on 
stakeholder analysis, policy change, education in emergencies, conflict-sensitivity, and 
complexity science. These sources came from searching databases (INEE Resource Bank, 
ERIC, World Bank Resources) and consulting works cited in other relevant documents 
and reports.  
Secondary data collection was important to keep up with developments in the 
field of CSE as well as Somalia’s education-related policies and practices, but also to 
make use of these sources for data and evidence to either substantiate or question claims 
made by key informants (Booth, Colomb, & Williams, 2008; Schmeer, 1999). Secondary 
sources also provided critical insights for definition of the CSE problem as well as to 
identify arguments that merited response in the study (Booth, Colomb, & Williams, 
2008).  
Stakeholder Identification 
In order to ensure the CSE issue is appropriate for stakeholder analysis, it should 
be specific and definable, key to current reform, and a socially and politically 
controversial topic that merits investment of time and resources before the analysis 
begins (Schmeer, 1999). This research used these criteria in defining the issue(s) or 
problem to be analyzed.  
Primary sources provided the raw data necessary for generating new evidence 
around CSE in Somalia. For this research, I collected my own primary data through 
various methods including interviews and focus-group discussions.  
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Again, I note that my positionality influenced the inclusion of certain stakeholders 
for the analysis. Inevitably “external” actors, including donors and international NGOs, 
were heavily represented. This reflects the neo-colonial structure and enterprise of aid 
mentioned earlier. A few critical groups were not included in this analysis. I was not able 
to include either clan leaders or umbrella stakeholders in the workshops or the interviews, 
and only realized their full significance through the interviews and further data analysis. 
Given the history of Somalia, which highlights the key role of clans and private sector 
leaders as stakeholders, in addition to being a limitation, this surfaces as a major finding 
of this research.  
I conducted multi-stakeholder fora that involved the application of a close-ended 
instrument (the Checklist), focus-group discussions, and key informant interviews. These 
helped me begin to identify important issues and actors, and to generate a hypothesis for 
CSE in Somalia. Even though this is a relatively new field, the guidance draws on 
conflict management theories and practice, which emphasize the importance of multi-
stakeholder analysis. All CSE tools that currently exist prioritize the need for a multi-
stakeholder analysis of education sector issues that impact conflict-sensitivity (INEE, 
2013; UNESCO-IIEP, 2011; USAID, 2013). 
My field research was initiated with a two-day hands-on workshop with 18 
participants, a follow-up two-day workshop with 30 participants, and finally 26 in-depth 
key informant interviews. It is important to note that these are not 74 unique informants; 
there was some overlap from group to group. Based on my previous definition of primary 
and secondary stakeholders, I identified all the stakeholders in this study as primary. 
There were zero secondary stakeholders or informants in this study.  
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First, a full-day CSE Checklist Application Workshop was conducted on 
November 14, 2012, at the Tribe Hotel, with 25 personnel from the USAID mission, 
partner government Ministry of Education, and implementing partners.18 Each participant 
tested the Checklist from their perspective as a member of a particular organization and 
filled out feedback forms on different aspects of the Checklist.  
In-depth, one-on-one interviews with key informants using checklists, semi-
structured interviews, and structured interview questionnaires enabled me to go into 
greater detail regarding the further identification of stakeholders; their behaviors, 
intentions, interrelations, and interests; and the resources they bring to bear on decision 
making in relation to the predefined CSE issue(s) in Somalia. The key informants are 
stakeholders. Time and availability of key informants was a consideration.  
I spoke to a range of experts to help explain and interpret what I found through 
primary data collection. This range of experts includes subject matter experts, donors, 
members of think tanks, and context experts. For example, I interviewed: Dr. Khadar 
Bashir-Ali, the Somalia education sector coordinator, and Francis Butchi, the chief of 
party for the Mercy Corps education program in Somalia.  
Priority Specification Regarding AKAE 
After the first workshop, another two-day structured workshop on Education 
Priority Setting was held with a group of 30 education stakeholders, broadening from the 
first application workshop and resulting in a group process to further explore and 
possibly change perceptions using the protocol tool described in the tool summary, 
                                                
18	Implementing partners include CARE, Mercy Corps, Norwegian Refugee Council 
(NRC), Save the Children, and World Vision.		
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above, that integrates CSE issues around awareness and knowledge, attitudes and 
enactment (AKAE). The questions in the protocol served as topical guides. The lists of 
questions were applied flexibly, and not every question was asked to every respondent. 
This approach recognized that not every respondent/group has something useful to say 
about every sub-topic. Additional follow-up questions were asked on the spot to probe 
into specific answers and topics.  
Questions were premised on there being a plan to conduct a nation-wide 
Education Sector Assessment (ESA) that respondents must be aware of and have 
opinions on. Organizing an ESA assumes stakeholders are able and willing to participate 
in collective problem-solving and strategic planning, which is in itself a commitment to 
recognizing the legitimate role played by a central state. I intentionally tailored the 
questions exhibited in Table 3.4 based on the respondents’ role and position.  
The list of priorities was further sharpened through the key informant interviews 
carried out after the two workshops. Out of the 26 key informant interviews, I collected 
114 individual data pieces related to key issues of CSE education. Each piece of data on a 
key issue was coded separately. For example, if one key informant provided five 
statements of a key issue, each was entered into my database as a separate issue. This 
technique allowed me to aggregate all the key issues and find the most prevalent based on 
how many times the issue came up overall. I coded these issues and generated a list of 
highest prevalence overall.  
Data Analysis 
For a stakeholder analysis, data analysis works iteratively with data collection 
(Varvasovszky & Brugha, 2000; Crosby & Brinkerhoff, 2002; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 
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1997). I recorded data from all sessions in oral and written form. As data collection 
progressed, I included provisional outputs in the matrix tables and created stakeholder 
maps to quantify stakeholder characteristics. I then analyzed the data to identify common 
themes and patterns and any discrepant views. I looked for feedback from neutral 
informants to confirm or add depth to the data collected from primary sources 
culminating in the stakeholder analysis table. Key steps in organizing and analyzing data 
included recording findings, evaluating and scoring my evidence, developing matrices 
based on the scores, and taking stock from neutral advisers to assess direction, validity, 
and finality of findings. Providing summary feedback to stakeholders and respondents 
was critical to the data analysis process in order to build trust and correct inaccurate 
reporting.  
Specifically, techniques for data analysis included the following key steps (Schutt, 
2011). 
1. Recording and then transcribing interviews.  
2. Transfering data from the analysis tables and collating survey responses.  
3. Developing interim data tables that draw out definitions of stakeholder 
characteristics, including a power index and spectrum for positions related to 
the issue, based on systematic coding of transcribed data.  
4. Utilizing these interim data tables and scores to conduct thematic analysis of 
the identity of important stakeholders, their knowledge of CSE, their priorities, 
and their position on CSE, as well as which stakeholders might form alliance.  
Analysis began by summarizing participation in the CSE Checklist Application 
Workshop as seen in Table 4.3 below. It is important to note the number of Somalis 
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represented in the first Workshop. Over half of the participants were ethnic Somali, 
thereby increasing the likelihood that Somali experience and perspectives will mitigate a 
neo-colonial influence on the process.  
Table 4.3: CSE Checklist Application Workshop Participant Numbers by 
Organization Type 
 
Organization Name 
Ethnic Somalis  Number of Participants 
Female Male 
USAID East Africa 1 4 2 
Ministries of Education (Somalia, 
Puntland, Somaliland) 
7 1 6 
USAID Implementing Partners 3 0 4 
Donors 1 2 3 
Development Organizations 
(INGOs/NGOs)  
3 3 0 
SubTotal   10 15 
TOTAL  15 25 
 
After compiling the workshop participant summary in the table above, further 
identification of key stakeholders was performed through assessment of the table and 
snowballing so that additional missing participants could be included. These stakeholders 
represent the most influential and broadest range of actors from a geographical 
perspective. I created a shortened list of priority key stakeholders for inclusion in my 
study. In view of the fact that resources, time, and funding for my study were limited, 
included stakeholders had to be limited to a realistic number. 
Table 4.4 includes my initial first round identification of the most evident key 
stakeholders and their roles.  
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Table 4.4: Somalia Education Stakeholders  
Affiliation  Title  Name 
Federal Government of Somalia  H.E. Minister of Education Dr. Khadar Bashir-
Ali  
Somaliland Ministry of Education  
 
Director General Mahamed Hassan 
Ibrahim  
Somaliland Ministry of Education  Technical Advisor/Finance 
Manager 
Ali Ismail Jirdeh  
Puntland Ministry of Education  Technical Advisor-Quality 
Assurance 
Adbulkadir Yusuf 
Nuh  
Puntland Ministry of Education  Director General Mohamed 
Abdiwahab 
Government of Somalia Ministry 
of Education  
Director General Muuse Faarax Xayd   
 
USAID/Kenya Education Advisor  Dr. Lucy Kithome  
Mercy Corps Somalia   Chief of Party/Education  Olad Farrah  
CARE International Youth Specialist Ibrahim Hussein  
Global Partnership for Education  Education Advisor, Somalia  Sven Braeten  
 
The framework shown in Table 4.5, below, and related tools aided in 
documenting and assessing key stakeholder characteristics. Collecting data and 
documenting these characteristics relied on a deeper understanding of their individual or 
collective involvement, interest, influence, and impact on CSE issues(s) or policies in 
Somalia. As key stakeholders were either interviewed separately or through focus group 
discussions, they were asked about the availability of written information, including 
reports, policy documents, and statements, which helped to inform and validate 
characteristics identified during interviews and discussions. While the identification of 
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key stakeholders was the first step in my research process, it was an iterative process, 
growing as I identified additional key stakeholders.  
In order to identify and characterize key stakeholders, I started with a purposeful 
sampling of a shortlist of key actors that included donors, state government education 
directors, multi-lateral education actors, and education leaders from civil society. From 
here I used snowballing by asking this first group questions like: Who are the key 
decision makers in the education sector? Who is opposed to this idea of joint education 
sector planning? Who speaks for teachers in this state? I tracked their names, positions, 
and contact information in a table format. I identified whether stakeholders are primary, 
secondary, or external. In order to collect data on each of these categories, I developed a 
questionnaire and accompanying checklists, along with a reference chart indicating which 
questions pertain to each category on the table. 
As noted earlier, I was not able to include either clan leaders or umbrella 
stakeholders in the workshops or the interviews, and only realized their full significance 
through the interviews and further data analysis. However, the majority of stakeholders, 
representing the government, international donors and NGOs, are Somalis,  and therefore 
local perspectives and goals are well represented in the data.  
Applying the tools presented a number of issues requiring decisions for adapting 
the guidelines to apply to the specific case in Somalia. These issues are addressed in 
Chapter 4.  
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Table 4.5: Stakeholder Analysis Matrix (Crosby, 1991) 
Characteristics of Stakeholders (Group or Individuals) 
Involvement in 
the issue  
Interest in 
the issue 
Influence/powe
r/resources  
Position Impact of issue 
on actor 
Internal/Extern
al involvement 
Knowledge of 
the issue or 
policy, level of 
accurate 
knowledge and 
how 
stakeholder 
defines the 
issue.  
Estimate of 
the level of 
interest of 
the group or 
individual in 
the issue.  
Indicate 
exactly what 
those 
interests are.  
High 
High 
Medium 
Medium 
High 
Medium 
Medium 
Low 
Low 
Medium  
Low 
 
Summary of 
resources held 
by group or to 
which it has 
access. 
These may 
include 
financial, 
information, 
status, 
legitimacy, and 
coercion. 
Summarized 
by a power 
index  
+3 to -3  
Estimate of the 
stakeholders’ 
position on the 
issue. 
Alliances  
Supportive 
Nonmobilized 
Opposed  
Or nominal 
quantitative 
measures such 
as +3 to -3. 
Opposed  
Estimate the 
effect the issue 
has on the 
actors’ work, 
relationships, 
networks.  
 
 
Once the characteristics had been defined, categorized, and ranked using various 
tools, I developed a stakeholder analysis table that serves as a consolidation of data as a 
tool for analysis. Table 4.5 lists the stakeholder characteristics across the top row 
(Schmeer, 1999). A process in coding my data included triangulation based on self-
perception and perception of other participant’s with respect to stakeholder characteristics 
in specific categories. For example, for one table, the Resource category is based on 
perceptions of the resources that every stakeholder brings to the education sector, the 
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power category represents the ability of stakeholders to influence, and the knowledge 
category refers to the relative experience and knowledge of stakeholders in the education 
sector in Somalia. For the categories of knowledge, resources, and power, I used a scale 
of 1-3. For the category of position, I used Schmeer’s spectrum of stakeholder positions: 
S=supporter, MS=moderate supporter, N=neutral, MO=moderate opponent, O=opponent 
(Schmeer, 1999, pp. 2-16). I used an analogous process to code and produce several 
tables representing other stakeholder characteristic groupings of interest, as described in 
greater detail below. Identifying stakeholder interest in the ESA was a critical step in 
the analysis process. When stakeholder interests were drawn out and coded, I recorded 
them using a structure shown in Figure 4.1 for data analysis. Through this process I was 
able to explore and document overlap as well as discontinuity in issues related to CSE in 
Somalia. Through this process I was able to focus in on areas of the largest overlap, and 
therefore identify pathways where success is the most likely outcome. The data gathering 
format for ESA interest is provided below as a tabular structure.19  
Stakeholders Interest/ Key Issue  Potential project impact  
(+ or -) 
Relative priorities of 
interest  
(1-5) 
Primary 
    
Secondary  
    
External  
    
Figure 4.1: ESA Stakeholder Interest Structure 
                                                
19 A category with an unspecified data type represents an on open-ended, fill-in response. 
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Identifying stakeholder’s views on whether the ESA is advisable was instructive 
in uncovering the potential for education-related negotiations across the three states. 
Related directly to CSE, this line of inquiry provided evidence for future policies that 
have the potential to be more inclusive and contribute to peace, a critical step in the 
analysis process. As advisability and CSE priorities were drawn out and coded, I 
recorded them using the format shown in Figure 4.2.  
Stakeholders In favor/ against CSE priority issue(s) Relative Score   
(1-5) high to low 
Primary 
    
    
Secondary  
    
    
Figure 4.2: Advisability and CSE Issues by the Various Stakeholders 
Uncovering and documenting stakeholder views on process and management of 
the ESA provided critical information on the degree to which the stakeholders perceive 
the ESA process as one that builds inclusion and participation, and engages different 
voices while at the same time exploring perceptions and experiences around key CSE 
dimensions related to curriculum and teacher professional development. As stakeholder 
views on process and management were drawn out and coded, I recorded them for data 
analysis using the format shown Figure 4.3.  
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Stakeholders Process  Management CSE Dimensions  
Primary 
    
    
Secondary  
    
    
External  
    
Figure 4.3: Process and Management of ESA 
Once I identified perceptions of risks and assumptions, I used the framework in 
Figure 4.4 to identify the appropriate type of stakeholder participation at the various 
phases of the action/policy/project cycle. Guidelines recommend the use of a matrix to 
clarify the roles to be played, at each stage of the project cycle, by all key stakeholders, 
including the government and the donor.  
Type of participation 
Stage in cycle 
Inform Consult Partnership Control 
Identification     
Planning      
Implementation      
Monitoring & Evaluation      
Figure 4.4: Coding Form: Participation Matrix  
Mapping alliances, power legitimacy, and urgency contributed to further 
development of a stakeholder typology (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). Based on data 
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gathered, I identified stakeholders in the following categories: dormant, discretionary, 
demanding, dominant, dependent, and dangerous.  
Out of the 26 key informant interviews, I collected 114 individual data pieces 
related to key issues of CSE education. I coded each piece of data on a key issue 
separately. For example, if one key informant provided five statements of a key issue, I 
entered each into my database as a separate issue. This technique allowed me to 
aggregate all the key issues and find the most prevalent based on how many times the 
issue came up overall. I coded these issues and generated a list of highest prevalence 
overall.  
Ethical Considerations and Reflexivity  
Using people as sources for data poses some ethical considerations, especially in 
conflict-affected fragile environments and above all when attempting to uncover 
perceptions around controversial topics that may put participants in danger if there is 
attribution to their views and comments (Booth, Colomb, & Williams, 2008).  
As an analyst and researcher seeking to convene stakeholders, I first analyzed my 
own role, objectives, and relationship to the stakeholders. Recognizing the values and 
perspective I bring to the research and my own understanding of the issues was a critical 
first step and will help the reader to digest and use the findings. My experiences as a 
Western female, an NGO worker, and currently as a member of a donor organization 
(USAID) impacted my position and perspective as I collected, reviewed, and analyzed 
the data for this study. I need to show awareness of my positioning, perspective, and bias 
in this process. It was important to recognize that since USAID currently does and will 
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continue to provide education investments in Somalia, people wanted to talk to me and 
said things in a certain way.  
As the convener of this research I have a unique perspective and a certain degree 
of power. As an employee of the US government, specifically USAID, I was likely to be 
perceived by respondents in a certain way. I brought legitimacy, but I also may have been 
seen as a threat symbolizing a dominant paternalistic world power. Some respondents 
may have answered inaccurately with the hopes of increased funding for their work, thus 
exhibiting participant bias. I was particularly observant for consistency bias, error bias, 
and sensitivity bias. I addressed this by clearly explaining my role as a researcher and 
desire that respondents provide data and reflection on their own efforts to improve 
education for Somali children. In addition, if an answer did not seem right, I asked for 
clarification and sought triangulation from other actors. Building trust was also 
important. In order to maintain my own objectivity and avoid moderator bias, my 
questions were crafted using neutral (direction-free) and open-ended content so as not to 
influence the responses.  
Ultimately, due to my position, I had access to the most influential actors in this 
field, and the opportunity to collect data and information from them was unique, 
important, and otherwise not readily available.  
Limitations 
Stakeholder analysis is not a silver bullet for policy change, but rather an 
instructive step in a series of actions that make policy and programmatic change more 
feasible and likely to succeed. While the process includes a set of tools for generating 
knowledge about actors, there is a common understanding that the analysis itself 
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represents a specific context and period in time, and therefore as contextual factors and 
key actors change and evolve, it is necessary to also keep abreast of sudden or 
unexpected transformations within the context and the relationships (Varvasovszky & 
Brugha, 2000).  
Equally important are Somali cultural norms around constructive and open 
criticism. Obtaining truthful, honest responses through the research is of the highest 
importance when doing qualitative data collection. It is important to build trust with 
respondents and to be clear on what the analysis will be used for, i.e., dissertation 
research as opposed to informing USG policy on education in Somalia. I worked to 
ensure participants felt safe in sharing their responses and opinions – which could be 
politically charged and unpopular vis-à-vis the policy environment – by building a 
rapport with my key informants and not rushing the interview process. Additional 
limitations included social desirability bias, which indicates a way of response that is 
deemed to be the answer that respondents think the researcher wants to hear. 
I addressed these limitations by clarifying with respondents how the research 
would be displayed through a pre-negotiated release form that they signed. This form 
outlined that their responses are non-attributable, and therefore they would not be directly 
quoted or identified with a particular view by name in this study.  
Summary 
As indicated, this research design is demand-driven and represents a real need that 
has been expressed by some of the key Somali education stakeholders. Various key 
actors, including the MoE and donors, have expressed the need to conduct an updated 
assessment of the education sector (ESA), to lead into the development of a nation-wide 
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education sector strategy. Taking advantage of this occasion helped me answer the 
research question. The context provided the means by which I could get people engaged 
in this question. As noted, stakeholder analysis provides a “snap shot” in Somalia of a 
rapidly changing context; this is central when discussing the limitations of this study, 
particulary when influence, positions, and identities of the key stakehodlers are likely to 
change over time.  
The methodology and procedures used to gather data for my study zeroed in on 
the first two phases of stakeholder analysis: (1) determining the CSE issue(s), and (2) 
analyzing constraints and opportunities and then utilizing the data to conclude who the 
important stakeholders are, their knowledge of CSE and the ESA, their priorities, and 
their position on the ESA, as well as which stakeholders might form alliances for the 
improvement of conceptualization and operationalizing the CSE construct.  
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CHAPTER 5   
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
 In this section I discuss findings related to identifying stakeholders, gauging their 
knowledge and practices in relation to CSE, identifying perceived facilitators and 
resisters of positive change in CSE, and the role of private education umbrellas. 
Determining the CSE Stakeholders and Issues  
Based on my review of the academic literature and conceptual approach, my 
research from secondary sources on past and present conditions in Somali, and my own 
professional experience and contacts, I made an initial determination of which groups to 
include for assessing the major stakeholders in the conflict-laden Somali education sector 
context. My initial determinations were generally confirmed in my research, although my 
conceptions of these stakeholders and their characteristics did evolve, and I recognized 
the need to expand the conception of stakeholder and “stakes,” as I will explain in what 
follows.  
Following Mitchell, Agle, & Wood (1997), and as applied by K’Akumu (2016), 
the prime criteria I used initially, and after further data collection and analysis, to identify 
stakeholders was a three-part model consisting of the levels of power, legitimacy, and 
urgency the stakeholder possessed or ascribed to the central issue of CSE. 
Starting with the most proximate stakeholders, including state-level and national 
government officials, I identified the Director General (DG) of Education and various 
technical advisors. These positions are the highest technical positions in education for 
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each state. The DGs are all male and almost entirely from the Somali diaspora in the 
United States or Canada, with advanced degrees in engineering, business, or humanities.  
While their legitimacy is relatively high in that their roles are acknowledged and 
accepted by civil society and external actors, including donors and the general 
population, discussions with parents and other community members revealed that the 
extent to which they are able to exercise their political power and to which their 
directives are obeyed is uncertain. This uncertainty stems from the lack of resources 
available to them to execute their visions and policies, and the existence of a large 
network of private education providers that operate in an unregulated policy 
environment20.  
The next group of individuals I identified included the donors. These are the key 
agencies providing funding for education in Somalia. This group included the European 
Union (EU) as the largest donor, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) 
as the second largest, the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), and the Japanese 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA). UNICEF is included in the donor group, but 
also considered an implementer. DfID is actively investing in Somalia, but their 
education program is managed from the United Kingdom, and therefore was not included 
as a source of key informants for this study. However, I did interview a team from 
CARE, the organization implementing DfID’s work in Somalia.  
                                                
20 The state configuration changed during the course of my research. In 2016, South 
Central began breaking up into several breakaway states including Galmudug, Jubaland, 
South West State, and Hirshabelle. Even now in early 2018, these states remain weak and 
rely largely on leadership and resources from Mogadishu. For consistency I refer to the 
states as they were identified at the start of my research – as Somaliland, Puntland, and 
South Central. I was able to interview all the government actors in Nairobi, Hargeisa, and 
Mogadishu. 
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After identifying government officials and donors, I set to identifying the main 
civil society and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that were responsible for the 
majority of education service provision in Somalia. I started with the NGOs that have 
been providing accelerated and informal education services, including CARE, the 
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), and Save the Children International. In addition to 
providing accelerated education, Mercy Corps has been funded by USAID for the past 
four years to deliver a secondary education program in Somaliland and Puntland. 
Combined, these organizations account for approximately 40 percent of education service 
provision in the country. 
As I began my search for NGO stakeholders I discovered that virtually no 
organizations were operational in South Central, the most conflicted and dangerous state. 
The majority of NGOs were operational in the comparatively safer states. This finding 
presented a conundrum that would prevail throughout my research. The safer, more stable 
states had comparatively sophisticated education systems – meaning they had a 
functioning state education office – and had the ability to manage and coordinate with 
NGO providers and donors. South Central was considered unsafe, unstable, and the 
location with the majority of the Al-Shabab activities. This suggests that, while a 
command structure and stability might be being necessary conditions for effective 
education, they may yet be insufficient if they do not meet the ethical criteria of social 
justice. 
Table 5.1 summarizes all stakeholders by type. The Education Priority Setting 
workshop was attended by a larger group because it was seen as a very important 
visioning activity. A smaller number of stakeholders were invited to the Conflict 
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Sensitivity workshop to leverage the advantages of a smaller, more technical group’s 
ability to engage with specific inputs on the key issues. Out of the total of 74, more than 
two-thirds (N=56) of these stakeholders were Somali (either Somali-Kenyan or Somali 
from Somalia), and the remainder were “Western.”  This helps to put into context the 
extent to which Western, and possibly neo-colonial perspectives, were predominant in the 
findings. Based on this large number of Somali stakeholders included in the study, I hope 
to have minimized the perception of paternalism or neo-colonialism. However, there is no 
guarantee that if one is ethnically born Somali, they are free of neo-colonial perspectives.  
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Table 5.1: Stakeholders by Type  
  Research Method Government Donor International 
NGO 
University Total  
Conflict Sensitivity 
Checklist Workshop  
7 6 5 0 18 
Education Priority Setting 
Workshop 
6 7 16 2 30  
Key Informant Interview 6 8 10 2 26 
Total  19 20 31 4 74 
  
 I categorized stakeholders’ characteristics around power, legitimacy, resources, 
and veto power, roughly, rating those as high or low as demonstrated in Table 5.2.  
Table 5.2: Stakeholder by Power, Legitimacy, Resources, Veto (1-3)  
 Power Legitimacy Resources Veto 
Federal 
Government  
3 2 1 3 
State 
Governments  
3 3 1 3 
Donor 3 3 3 2 
NGO 2 2 2 1 
University  1 2 2 1 
 
Out of the 26 key informants, all strongly agreed on the need for sector-wide 
planning. However, some of the stakeholders require a higher level of attention to their 
concerns due to their influence , knowledge , and ability to mobilize and direct resources. 
This analysis helps to identify donors, including the  EU, USAID, UNICEF, GPE, and 
the World Bank, as having all three important characteristics for sustaining behavior 
change: high levels of knowledge, ability to mobilize, and power. While the government 
actors have similar high levels of knowledge and ability to mobilize, their access to 
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resources is extremely low. This illustrates the importance of coalitions and partnership 
among donors and government officials. While these stakeholders all agree on the overall 
need to develop a shared plan, the details of the plan and how to achieve its goals require 
further examination. For example, when probed, donors reveal that they are most 
interested in discrete, time-bound activities that lead to clear outcomes, including 
enrollment and learning . By contrast, government officials see inputs as being most 
needed: for example, teaching and learning materials, school infrastructure, and teacher 
salaries. Negotiating this tension between inputs and outcomes prioritized by donors and 
government officials is critical for Somalia. Equitable access is less about what is 
provided and achieved, and more about who and which groups are prioritized. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Stakeholders by Power, Resources, and Knowledge  
As shown in Figure 5.1, the university and the NGO stakeholders proved  to have 
strong knowledge of the education-related needs on the ground. They were also 
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overwhelmingly supportive of sector-wide planning and policymaking; however, they 
were careful to note that the government had the unique power to make the final 
decisions on geographic locations where resources should be targeted. Transforming 
equity, a foundational aspect of CSE, can only be achieved when adjustments are made to 
inequities in resource allocation.  
The discussion around geographic location of schools and resource allocation to 
various schools was very revealing; a full 70 percent of NGO stakeholders noted that an 
overwhelming number of government officials had financial and personal interests in the 
private school sector, also known as the umbrellas, and this led to resource-allocation 
decisions that were based on these interests. This problem is further explained in the 
following example provided by an NGO stakeholder:  
We are provided funding by the donors to build public schools where there are no 
schools, and provide education for vulnerable children. You know there are very 
few public schools in Somalia. But we are required to get the approval of the 
government before we can build the schools, and even get the location of where 
the schools should be built. The government official tells us to build a school in a 
specific location, and then after the school is built, a private school takes it over. 
Then we find out that the government official or his relatives own the private 
school. The children who were intended to benefit from this never do, and the 
donors funding is wasted building a school that is taken over by a private 
company. There is nowhere to settle this dispute.  
This critical example of private education providers overtaking public education 
spaces diverts scarce resources for public education to the private sector. Only a few 
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government officials also mentioned this problem, but the NGOs were very eager to get 
this on the agenda. A key source of tension is the ongoing corruption cited above, which 
stymies and reverses any progress on standards, regulations, sector strategies, and 
policies that seek to reduce this. One way to break through includes the collective 
agreement about the appropriate use of donor funding, in other words, a shifting that 
would broaden the stakeholder base to include public school officials. 
While the NGO and university stakeholders lack power, most of them have high 
degrees of knowledge.. Some of the NGO stakeholders’ perspectives are rights-based, 
and they have benefited from global professional development and exposure to evidence 
and literature that drives their work. Each of these organizations have a long track record 
of education service provision in Somalia, in the Kenya refugee contexts, and globally. 
NGO stakeholders are also more familiar and experienced with how to prioritize, 
manage, and be accountable for external resources. This knowledge and experience is 
critical in the process of CSE sector planning, and for ensuring accountability, equity, and 
justice in the education sector.  
Finally, there were a few key NGO stakeholders that, while not exhibiting high 
levels of power (resources), were identified by others as leaders. These NGO leaders are 
in a unique position because they come with a great deal of respect, an external 
perspective, and internationally-based values related to education. After probing this, I 
uncovered that long-term donor support through contracts and grants helps provide this 
credibility and legitimacy.  
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In summary, stakeholder analysis tools illuminated both the issues that were most 
important to certain actors as well as the differences in prioritization, which will be 
further discussed in this chapter.  
Gauging Knowledge and Practice of CSE among Stakeholders 
Government and donor stakeholder knowledge on CSE was minimal prior to the 
workshop. For example, several participants noted that they have never looked in-depth 
at the collection of learners across the country to really understand the extent of how 
strategic, programmatic, and implementation/operational decisions can marginalize 
groups and exacerbate conflict. 
Donors reported that their participation in the Conflict Sensitivity Checklist 
Workshop could help raise awareness of the dire needs of Somalia’s education sector and 
the clear opportunities for the donor community to contribute to meeting the SDG 4 
target: “By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable, and quality 
primary and secondary education leading to relevant and Goal-4 effective learning 
outcomes.” 
While quality education as a general principle can be a starting basis for 
agreement, further investigation of potentially clashing priorities was necessary before 
any attempt to operationalize that basis. 
CSE Priorities  
After the first workshop, another two-day structured workshop on Education 
Priority Setting was held with a group of 30 education stakeholders, broadening from the 
first application workshop and resulting in a group process to further change perceptions 
on awareness, knowledge, attitude, and enactment (AKAE) of CSE education projects. 
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Based on robust discussion, the following criteria were utilized for prioritization of CSE 
issues in Somalia: need, outcome, impact, niche, and sustainability. Semi-structured 
group discussions on CSE priorities were captured in four distinct sub-categories: access 
and enrollment, quality and learning, education systems, and peace building and stability. 
A consensus approach was used in small groups to narrow down and come up with four 
key priorities, with accompanying sub-components to focus in on the specific goals 
within each priority relevant to the context in Somalia. Table 5.3 summarizes the priority 
areas identified, along with specific activities to achieve them.  
Table 5.3: CSE Priorities by Goal, and Sub-goals  
Priority 1: Access 
and Enrolment 
 
Priority 2: Quality 
and Learning 
 
Priority 3: 
Education Systems 
 
Priority 4: Peace 
Building and 
Stability 
 
1. Expand access in 
locations with no 
education 
opportunities.  
2. Increase 
proportion of 
certified (motivated 
and incentivized) 
teaching force. 
Improve 
management of 
schools. 
3. Expand and 
legitimize NFE and 
ABE options 
(consider children 
experiencing 
disabilities). 
 
1. Develop and 
implement standard 
curriculum 
(including learning 
competencies and 
appropriate teaching 
and learning 
materials).    
2. Develop 
comprehensive 
teacher development 
management system.  
Improve reading 
outcomes in early 
grades.  
3. Strengthen quality 
assurance systems 
linked to learning 
outcomes. 
1. Develop and 
implement effective 
targeted policies to 
guide education 
across states and 
zones.  
2. Make education 
financial systems 
transparent and 
accountable.   
3. Harmonize data 
collection and data 
use for education 
decision-making 
(EMIS).  
4. Align higher 
education with 
national 
development 
planning.  
 
1. Integrate civic 
education, peace 
building and 
conflict resolution 
into the primary and 
secondary school 
curriculum.    
2. Promote culture 
of peace and 
dialogue in Somali 
Institutions.    
3. Ensure equity in 
resource distribution 
for education.   
4. Promote 
opportunities for 
social interaction 
among the youth 
and communities.    
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Drawing out the conflict-sensitivity aspects of the priorities listed in Table 5.3, one can 
see that equity and access for marginalized groups figure prominently in the “access and 
enrollment” priority.  
The data shown in Figures 5.2 and 5.3, below, highlight clearly the diversity in 
prioritization by stakeholder type and the relationship between the stakeholders. 
 
Figure 5.2: CSE Key Issue Prevalence by Stakeholder  
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Figure 5.3: Key Issue Prevalence Total         
A key finding emerging included the gaps in the traditional CSE tools. By 
allowing stakeholders to identify CSE issues on their own with the appropriate probes, 
key issues surfaced that are not included in the Checklist. Examples are costs associated 
with education, the role of non-state actors, low capacity of actors, and the impact on 
teaching, learning, and access.  
When prioritized issues are considered in combination with relative power and 
influence, a clear picture begins to materialize. For example, a unified policy is of highest 
importance to donors, who exert a high level of influence and power due to their access 
to financial resources and political capital. Conversely, for the government, which exerts 
influence through the ability to veto any programmatic action proposed by external 
actors, the top two issues are umbrella schools and inputs to schools. Interestingly, weak 
government institutions as a key issue has high prevalence for both government and 
donors, ranking at the second-highest prevalence. The NGO stakeholders have identified 
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weak government institutions as their highest priority and curriculum development as 
their second. Table 5.4 illustrates the long list of key issues sorted by prevalence by 
stakeholder type.  
Table 5.4: Key Issue Data: Long List  
Key Issue Donors Govt NGO Univ.  Prevalence 
Weak government institutions  5 3 9 0 17 
Unified policy  6 2 3 2 13 
Standards for teachers 
professional development  
2 2 2 3 9 
Access to education  1 3 3 1 8 
Curriculum development  1 2 5 0 8 
Security barriers 2 2 2 2 8 
Cost associated with education  1 2 4 0 7 
Umbrella private schools  0 4 1 1 6 
Low capacity of actors 2 1 2 0 5 
Inputs to school, teaching and 
learning materials  
0 4 0 0 4 
Importantly, as we disaggregated the government priorities between the main 
regions, significant differences emerged, pointing to the severe security issues in South 
Central that drive the priorities around security and safety. As more specific issues 
surfaced, I further categorized the key issues by stakeholder group as shown in Table 5.5, 
in terms of priority:  
  
 92 
Table 5.5: Key Issue by Stakeholder Type 
Stakeholder Type No of Responses Top 5 Key Issues 
Government Federal  22 Inputs: Schools, T & L supplies 
Umbrella/private school 
Youth/extremism  
Standards for teacher PD  
Curriculum reform/development  
Government Somaliland  3 Access to education  
Cost 
Unified policy development 
Government Puntland 5 Access to education  
Conflict/security/safety barriers 
Geographic disputes 
Hard to reach populations  
Resource distribution  
Government South/Central  4 Weak gov't institutions  
Conflict/security/safety barriers 
Umbrella/private School 
Donor 27 Unified policy development 
Weak gov't institutions  
Conflict/security/safety barriers 
Geographic disputes 
Lack of good data  
International NGO 10 Weak gov't institutions  
Curriculum reform/development  
Cost 
Access to education  
Unified policy development 
 
This data offers some insight into the risks associated with promoting a certain 
course of action when an influential group may not prioritize that course of action.  
In summary, the greater CSE awareness of stakeholders created through the 
Conflict Sensitivity Checklist Workshop in turn affected the priorities selected in the 
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Priority Setting Workshop. This deeper understanding provided an important foundation 
for stakeholders from various groups to grapple with and articulate what was most 
pressing to them. Donors saw the need for unified policy development because they are 
motivated by efficiency and values for money. NGO actors were most concerned about 
improving the capacity of government institutions to enable progress and ease 
bottlenecks. Finally, government actors were clear that the most pressing need is 
resources to provide education inputs considering they are motivated by political and 
civic responsibilities to their constituents.  
Change Facilitation or Blockage 
I addressed the question related to exposing who (or in this case what) are the 
resisters and facilitators of change through my key informant interviews, specifically 
questions 20–27 of my interview protocol. This set of questions helped to identify 
conflicts of interests among stakeholders, which influence the assessment of risks and 
relations among them.  
The Relationship Between the Center and the States   
Unexpectedly, these questions, linked with other discussions, uncovered that one 
of the most pressing tensions that existed between the central government and the state 
governments. Within the education sector, key features including education policy, 
teacher professional development and deployment, and curriculum helped to illuminate 
lines of division in the centralization vs. decentralization debate. This tension was less 
about disagreement, and more related to legitimacy, capacity, and will.  
The key informant interviews surfaced the challenges in the education system due 
to weak government institutions attributed to the relatively recent establishment of the 
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new Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), and to the overwhelming need to build 
coherence, legitimacy, capable leadership and clear structures. This echoes one of the 10 
benchmarks of the Somali National Development Plan: “Federal political and economic 
framework that empowers the federal member states to deliver services and economic 
opportunities to the citizens of Somalia in a secure environment” (Federal Government of 
Somalia, 2017, p. iii).  
Figuring out and articulating the way in which the education structures within the 
states and the FGS relate to each other was a clear priority in responses. Fiscal 
responsibility, particularly as related to macro-fiscal systems and the ability to raise and 
spend public resources for education, was cited as a key foundational step that any other 
progress in education will be built upon. From NGO:  
Financing for education (in all states) is completely lacking, thus communities 
continue to bear the brunt.  
This has a direct link to equity in educational access and the ability for states to 
raise and then spend resources to reach the most vulnerable and marginalized 
populations. The broad structure of fiscal federalism remains an area that has yet to be 
defined within the FGS as a whole.  
Public expenditure reviews for the states are identified as an important step in 
developing a unified policy. Specifically, the distribution of resources seems inequitable, 
or at least unclear, to many stakeholders. For example, GPE treats the three states as 
independent governments, each with their own sector plans and programs. In order to 
facilitate these applications, the division of the Maximum Country Allocations is 
calculated based on a formula approved by the GPE Board. Based on the available data, 
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four variables were considered: school-age population 6 to 13, enrollment ratio of total 
enrollment in primary relative to the population 6 to 13, gender parity in enrollment, and 
percentage of rural population.  
Table 5.6: GPE Allocation to Somalia by State 2016  
State Allocation 
Somaliland  
 
US$ 9.6 million 
Puntland US$ 5.6 million 
 
Central and Southern  US$ 17.9 million 
 
 
The GPE calculation leads to the above division of the US$ 33.1 million 
Maximum Country Allocation that has been agreed among all stakeholders (Global 
Partnership for Education, 2016) displayed in Table 5.6. While clearly Central and 
Southern Somalia are identified as having the most need, there is ongoing debate among 
the states that they should be receiving equal amounts. Complicating this debate is the 
critique that Central and Southern are unable to spend the resources given the security 
situation and the very small number of NGOs in the state .  
A harmonized, unified education policy could pave the way for efficiency and 
fairness. The need for a unifying education policy and legal framework that spans the 
three states looms large. Informants expressed the need for the FGS to work to set 
policies broadly and across the states. An NGO stakeholder links this to the need for a 
harmonized strategy for education:  
The European Union agrees …the federal MoE should set clear priorities by zone. 
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Currently, each state develops a five-year Education Sector Plan. A review of 
each state’s 2015 JRES shows convergence on top-line priorities around access, quality 
education, youth, equity and inclusiveness, higher education, and governance. While they 
echo the priorities coming out of the Priority Setting Workshop, there is currently no 
overarching document that consolidates education policies across the states. Many 
participants felt that the Ministries of Education should take the lead, with support from 
their donor and development partners. The senior members of the Ministries of Education 
were interested and willing but felt that they would need a strong donor partner to 
advance CSE.  
The autonomous structure of Somaliland and the semi-autonomous structure of 
Puntland make this work uniquely challenging given that autonomy may result in strong 
state-level educational organization, but less effectiveness at the state-level due to a lack 
of resources from the government. 
From a government stakeholder:  
The Somaliland case is a bit similar in terms of the numbers of children that are 
out of schools; however, they are ahead of Somalia in terms of standardized 
services. For example, their government has approved their curriculum 
framework. They have well-functioning schools mainly in urban centers but they 
need teacher training, materials development, and educational management at the 
central and regional levels. 
Similarly, a state government official remarked:  
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Harmonization of policies and aligning state strategies is key. I might say that 
every zone or every region is doing their own thing. This is the biggest challenge 
– the whole might be better than the small part. If the MoE knows that the 
minister might be OK, the DG might be OK, but the local staff, they might have 
so many questions about it. 
Interestingly, only government informants from Puntland and Somaliland didn’t 
consider weak institutions a problem. This illuminates a contraction specifically among 
government actors, and points to a lack of self-awareness specifically for Puntland and 
Somaliland. Further investigation is needed to explore the extent to which the two states 
perceive the strength of their institutions.  
Donor fragmentation is a result of a weakened central system that is unable to set 
policies and procedures for the states. A federal government official stated:  
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates intervene without consulting other education 
actors. In 2007, there was a framework of division of labor. For instance, Sweden 
focused on health; EU on education; DfID on research; the nontraditional donors 
– Gulf countries – simply provide funds. We try to manage overlaps through 
GPE.  
Donors in particular were behind a “more harmonized” approach to education 
provision (i.e., centralized, central policies). To donors, harmonization translates into 
creating common standards and strategies to achieve these standards across the various 
states. While each state would have the responsibility to regulate and enact those 
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standards, ideally there would be a system to aggregate performance and progress 
nationally. A donor stakeholder said:  
There is currently no link between policy and achievement. Somaliland is just so 
political. Harmonization of work is the most important issue; many actors are 
doing the same work in education; there is a great deal of duplication. We need to 
put our investment and efforts into building foundations that endure beyond three 
years. We should recognize the political trends. The most important overarching 
thread is to define what the STATE means. There are emerging regional 
administrations.  
NGO officials saw unified policies as being very helpful to their work:  
The fragmentation of the country affects implementation and progress. Somalia 
needs a national policy on education and then regional policies to be aligned to 
the national policy. 
A university administrator stressed:  
We need the role of central government to make quality controls of education. A 
lot of schools are opening without any consultation with the central government. 
We are willing to accept regulation from the central government. Right now there 
is no control, anyone can open up anything and call it a faculty or a school. We 
are ready to help the government with these policies. We need a government 
system that regulates and creates policies.  
The administrator went on to attribute decentralization to clan loyalties: 
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Basic and consistent standards for teachers and professional development are 
needed to reduce clan-based decisions for teacher deployment.  
From International NGO:  
In terms of engaging local authorities working with the three ministries on 
education, this takes a great deal of effort and time. Negotiating with them is 
time-consuming in spite of that some are more ahead than others and we can learn 
a lot from them.  
The dual track policy of some donors, particularly the US and the EU, came up in 
discussion with all types of informants. Dual track policy means that a donor deals with 
central state and sub-state actors simultaneously in order to advance peace and 
development in Somalia. This policy has been criticized by some, who say that it has the 
potential to strengthen clan divisions, undermine inclusive and democratic trends, and 
creates a favorable environment for the return of the organized chaos or warlordism in the 
country.  
According to interviews with higher education institution officials and NGOs 
working to build teacher capacity, the experience of teachers in terms of how they are 
trained, paid, and perform is directly linked to the planning and decision making of the 
government, both at the federal level and that of the three states. Teacher training, 
recruitment, and retention are a major problem and hindrance to progress in education for 
Somalia. There is a dearth of qualified teachers in the classrooms, and their selection 
process remains clan-based instead of based on knowledge, skill, and practical 
experience.  
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Currently, higher education institutions are not equipped to address the challenge 
of training teachers and do not have solid teacher-training programs or quality faculty to 
teach the courses for preservice teacher training. In addition, the practical, experiential 
training that comes with in-service professional development is also suffering as a result. 
The much-needed teaching and learning materials are scarce, as there is one textbook for 
every nine students and supplementary materials are nonexistent.  
According to responses, the content of the curriculum is often divisive and biased, 
a reflection of the “two faces of education.” An overwhelming number of government, 
donor, and international NGO informants were concerned about the curriculum and its 
divisiveness, particularly concerning the social studies and history content.  
Divisions, both among states and between the states and the center, are magnified 
through the history curriculum. Drawing on the history of the conflict, which grew out of 
resistance to the Siad Barre regime in the 1980s, regional clan-based rebel groups came 
together to overthrow the regime. In a virtual power vacuum, these groups fought for 
power over Mogadishu. Atrocities in Somaliland carried out by the Siad Barre regime 
created grievances, especially in Somaliland, against the FGS that remain to this day. A 
high-level government official stated:  
Social Studies are taught differently across all zones. It also remains a subject of 
division, as history is interpreted based on past/historical painful realities. Clans 
across Somalia want to teach their children real or sometimes invented clan 
history that might or might not agree with what the books say. Therefore, the 
subject of history is very political and divisive. Even the colonial history with 
documentation is being interpreted to favor a particular clan.  
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The collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 resulted in a civil conflict marked 
by widespread abuses against civilians and with devastating effects on education, 
including the destruction and damage of schools and universities and the closure of 
education facilities for long periods of time, particularly in the south and central parts of 
the country (Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, 2014). Because the 
educational deficit in Somalia is one of the most acute in the world, youth and children 
miss out on critical services and become increasingly vulnerable to recruitment by 
extremists and/or criminal elements (Ministry of Education and Higher Education, 
2013/2014). The destruction of Somalia’s education system makes education planning 
and implementation highly inadequate and inefficient. 
Even though the state-by-state curriculum presents a huge challenge, one can see 
this as an opportunity as well. The high degree of agreement on the need to make 
progress on education, the slowly growing legitimacy of the FGS, and the recognition 
that the time is ripe for some type of harmonization provides the potential for the 
education system to promote reconciliation. One international NGO official said:  
We need to address it in the curriculum from the perspective of reconciliation. 
How? Talk about Rwanda as an example; integrate elements of different regions 
into the different curriculum (by zone), remove destructive information from the 
curriculum. Somaliland curriculum for social studies grade 5 talks about the 
conflict between Somaliland and Somalia – it has a secessionist agenda – we need 
to break away. I looked at the books for teaching reading in Lower Shabelle. And 
the Head Teacher told me we do not use any books that have been given by the 
government, Al-Shabab is there, Al-Shabab gave us a program that teaches 
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violence, how to kill people (it is in Arabic). I have not seen the copy. We are 
teaching children how to hate. 
While discussions around centralization vs. decentralization are common, 
especially in fragile settings, this issue is a top priority that requires discussion and 
agreement before any meaningful progress is made. Data collected through my research 
helped to uncover the call from virtually all stakeholders for the FGS to provide some 
degree of regulation and structure to education work in the country. This balance between 
the state and the center needs to be carefully calibrated and considered in a phased 
approach that analyzes on an ongoing basis the financial and human capital needed for 
Somalia. A key vehicle will be the history curriculum and how to address reconciliation 
through education institutions. The interviews clearly indicate that actors expect the 
government to set the policy, though the low capacity and weak power of relative states 
figures prominently. Teacher professional development, deployment, harmonization, and 
curriculum are key features of the debate.  
Private Education Umbrella Networks   
The responses showed a strong recognition that the private education providers 
have stepped in at an important time, during extreme chaos and instability, and provided 
a service the government was unable to provide. From the government:  
Initially the umbrellas were helpful because they stood up education, but now 
public education conflicts with their mission. 
Over the past 20 years of instability, a majority of previously public education 
institutions were taken over by private education institutions, and now the government is 
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faced with a major power struggle to reclaim these spaces for public education. Data on 
this is thin, and obtaining realistic numbers on the private education system is a hot 
political issue given the relationship between some government officials and private 
education providers when many high officials in government are personally invested in 
these schools. One government official from South Central stated:  
Facilities, schools, and centers built by the government have to come back to the 
ownership of the government. International donors should discourage tactics and 
barriers to that success. We have heard about people putting barriers to education 
development. The Ministers of Interior, Education, and Foreign Affairs – they do 
not help smooth transfer of funds.  
Strong criticism and concern by NGO stakeholders emerged on the political 
power and to some extent desire of the FGS to regulate private education. In combination 
with the lack of data on the scope of private education, there is an additional problem 
related to influence of external actors, including other Middle East agents.  
Because of the lack of regulation of these providers, private education quality and 
content varies considerably, allowing Middle East countries like Qatar and Kuwait to 
provide what could be considered as much-needed financial and in-kind inputs, like 
books, to private schools. These inputs come at a price, and NGO stakeholders believe 
they can do harm. At worst these inputs could contain extremist or biased messages, and 
at best they could provide learning content that is not relevant to the Somali context. 
Another example of the effects of the inability of the FGS to regulate private 
education is illustrated in the influence of Turkey on youth employment skill building. 
An NGO stakeholder provided this quote:  
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Providing this training for youth creates a path to employment in Turkey, thus 
creating human capital for Turkey. I wonder how much they want to help Somalis 
learn and stay in the country. They always just provide scholarships to high-
performing students, thus promoting the brain drain out of the country. Our youth 
are being lured away to work for other countries and not help rebuild Somalia.  
While the extent to which the private education providers are aligned with militias 
is unclear, there is evidence that the militias exert some degree of influence on private 
education. This was demonstrated during the drive to provide countrywide unified 
secondary exams. During this time, the militias joined forces with private education 
providers – enabled by the relationships militia members and supporters have to clans 
that run private education – to try and prevent the implementation of the national exam. A 
government stakeholder commented as follows:  
The militias are against a unified exam. Umbrellas are a problem because they are 
a money-making machine they don't want to see MoE keeping them from making 
money. They don't want MoE to have legitimacy over them. 
Increasing government authority over the education sector presents a perceived 
attack on private education providers in that greater government control would curtail the 
private operators’ profits. Controls on content, teacher remuneration, and minimum 
requirements for school infrastructure present an uncertain future for the umbrellas. From 
an international NGO:  
The Umbrellas will oppose unified education sector planning, especially in South 
Central. They will feel a lot will go out of their hands and control.  
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Fortunately, the private sector providers are not monolithic, and stakeholders 
provided at least one example of a moderate values-based group that was willing to 
negotiate with the government in the past. A government stakeholder said:  
The Islamic Course Union (ICU), a moderate outfit, wanted to work with the 
government and agencies – Al-Shabab were a part of it, it is now gone. There was 
a link with umbrellas.  
Umbrellas are well organized and they have a strong association. One of those 
associations is called "Dhamu Jadid" – the new blood – and is a political 
association, this is the group the President belongs to; he has strong say in 
umbrellas.  
Clan politics permeate the state and federal governments, and the prevalence of 
private education skews motivation towards profit making rather than advancing 
equitable outcomes in education.  
Government and NGO actors have provided critical reflection on the role and 
power of nonstate actors. While the Somalia government actors acknowledge the 
important gap the private actors are filling, NGO stakeholders shed light on the varying 
degrees of quality and the extent to which private actors are taking public education 
investments over.  
Why did the same level of concern not come up with donors? The data suggests  
donors are for the most part unaware of the power and control that the umbrellas exert on 
the education in Somalia, and this is troubling. Data from interviews and the workshops 
overwhelmingly point to the need to bring the private sector actors to the table as both 
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key contributors to solving the education problems in Somalia and as negotiators for a 
regulatory role for the government.  
Issue-Based Facilitation or Blockage of Change  Which stakeholders are most likely to 
facilitate change and which most likely to block it?  Successful implementation of 
education policy change in Somalia requires a level of agreement with key stakeholders. 
Table 4.8 represents overall findings for the key issues identified, including with respect 
to facilitation\blockage: a) the dominance of private provision of education operating 
outside the government framework through umbrellas; b) the inability of the government, 
both from a capacity and financial perspective, to regulate quality and access to 
education; c) donor fragmentation, or a lack of coherence of donor priorities that leads to 
inefficient use of scarce resources available from donors for education. This can result in 
investments that are not prioritized by the Somali people; d) employment skills needed 
for youth, recognizing that the purpose of education is expected to lead to livelihood 
security and employment; e) geographic disputes or conflicts leading to insecurity, which 
impact education and need to be considered when planning for education reform; and f) 
hard to reach populations, including pastoralists, nomadic populations, girls, and children 
with disabilities.  
The analysis of stakeholder characteristics and issues illustrates where greatest 
agreements can be forged and which groups must be negotiated with in order to make 
progress on change on that issue.  
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Table 5.7: Mapping of Stakeholder Agendas and Influence: Key Sector Issues  	
Key Issue 
Agreement/ 
Overlap 
Division/ Not 
prioritized Prevalence 
Umbrella Private 
Schools 
NGOs, Government Donors 
6 
Strengthen Weak 
Government 
Institutions  
Federal 
Government, NGOs, 
Donors 
Somaliland and 
Puntland 
5 
Donor 
fragmentation/ 
Coherence  
NGOs, Government Donors 
5 
Employment skills 
for youth  
NGOs N/A 
4 
Geographic disputes NGOs Donors 3 
Hard to reach 
populations  
Government  
3 	
 
Through the coding of my data in key issues related to the first five questions in 
my interview protocol, I drew out which stakeholders were more concerned with 
particular issues. I was able to see where there is overlap, division, or a lack of 
prioritization. Regarding division, I further analyzed the various groups and described 
their candidacy as potential resisters.  
I found donors stakeholders did not prioritize the umbrella private schools issue; 
and therefore most of their funding is being used to advance education without 
addressing issues related to issues like umbrella schools taking over public spaces, 
offering what is considered a higher quality education, and driving clan biases through 
education while progressing on other basic education outcomes will remain stagnate. 
Second, I found the importance of strengthening weak institutions as a priority for all 
actors, excluding Somliland- and Puntland-government stakeholders. This implies that 
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those two states perceive their governments to be functioning adequately. However data 
on education outcomes for both states reveals low quality and access to education across 
the three states.  
Not surprising, challenges related to donor fragmentation are acknowledged by all 
the other stakeholder groups except for the donors themselves. This points to a strong 
lack of self-awareness by the donors, and requires specific targeting of donors so that 
they are made aware of the impacts of fragmentation in order to work on a coherent 
investment plan.  
This analysis led me to identifying the private sector – or "umbrellas" – as 
resisters of change. In addition to the umbrellas, other key stakeholders that have the 
potential to block change include the government of Somaliland and the clans. Therefore, 
the key stakeholders that require attention and voice in order to ensure change that is real 
and sustained include the umbrellas, the Somaliland government, and clans. Each of these 
stakeholders has the potential to derail efforts to improve efficiency, conflict-sensitivity, 
and equitable improvement of outcomes for children and youth in education.  
While there is agreement on some key issues, we can see from the data that 
important divisions do exist. This can also indicate a lack of interest as opposed to 
outright division or disagreement. Strong facilitators for change include the federal 
government and the donors. The most powerful and influential stakeholders with the 
potential to change the course of Somali education are a combination of donors and the 
federal government.  
Awareness of the power dynamics is strong among most of the actors, although 
the donor group remains unaware of the extent to which the private actors have sway. 
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With the inclusion of umbrellas, the government of Somaliland, and clans as key resisters 
of change, any efforts to bring about positive social and behavioral change will need to 
engage all three. However, to date only Somaliland has been significantly engaged.  
Findings from this research provide insight into how to explore and document the 
key levers that generate knowledge about the relevant actors so as to understand their 
behavior, intentions, interrelations, agendas, interests, and the influence or resources they 
have brought – or could bring – to bear on integrating CSE. That knowledge can be 
translated into strategies and processes to help manage the development of relevant and 
realistic policies aimed at decreasing bias and exclusion, and increasing equity and justice 
within the education system 
Revisiting the Conceptual Framework  
I theorize that a more in-depth understanding and analysis of the positions of key 
stakeholders and their priorities uncovers additional steps related to relationship building, 
negotiation, and honest discussions. This deeper perspective exposes the trade-offs that 
preclude agreement for action or behavior change. Therefore, the following steps are 
critical:  
1. Identify CSE issues 
2. Identify CSE stakeholders  
3. Assess stakeholder characteristics  
4. Identify resisters and facilitators  
5. Utilize findings to develop a roadmap for effective CSE integration  
(e.g., a process that integrates data and dialouge to affect social change).  
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I found it was important not to overclaim the association between the last two 
steps, and to note that the link between “utilize findings” and “equity and justice” is a 
very large one. Stakeholder analysis and CSE have the potential to contribute to an 
effective sector assessment and strategy, but the apporach on its own is not sufficient to 
achieve equity and justice; that outcome requires follow-up action subsequent to the work 
done in this research.  
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CHAPTER 6   
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH   
Introduction 
The following summarizes the conclusions drawn from this study.  
1. Education sector stakeholders in Somalia were identified in the five major 
categories initially identified, including the federal government, the state 
governments, donors, NGOs, and universities.  
2. CSE was generally not very well known by Somali government and donor 
participants. They were thus found relatively conflict-sensitivity-blind. 
3. The donors were found to have an advantage over the relatively weakly 
governing Somali federal government in that the donors possessed resources 
the government lacked. Their strengths were in legitimacy, knowledge and 
resources. Yet the government uniquely had the authority to allocate resources, 
the axis of power. This led to tensions when the two differed on which schools 
were worthy of resource allocation. 
4. Government officials are so invested in the private umbrellas that they might 
very well resist interest in funding public schooling from other stakeholders. 
This represented a bias detrimental to educational quality. Greed and self-
interest made evident the negative face of the educational system in Somalia. 
5. The second workshop revealed a general consensus that meeting the 
educational needs of marginalized groups should have higher priority. This 
suggests the stakeholder model might expand to include parents, community 
members, lower-paid staff, more women, and other groups. 
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6. The research suggested that the definition of the "stakes" of education should 
better incorporate the needs of such marginalized groups (Bryson, 2004). 
New priorities might include: costs associated with education, the role of 
nonstate actors, low capacity of actors.  
7. The distribution of greater resources to other states seems inequitable or at 
least unclear to many stakeholders in the more autonomous states of 
Somaliland and Puntland. These same two states, while recognizing the need 
for an overarching and unifying statement of education policy, nevertheless 
may not realize their own attachment to their own policies brought about by 
their loose federal governance and self-perceived independence. Such state-
centric biases were highlighted through this research effort. 
8. Several participants reported that, although the Checklist was a sound over-
arching framework and addressed all the relevant and pertinent aspects of 
conflict-sensitivity in education, they also felt that supplemental tools that 
focused on conflict-sensitivity analysis specific to a given domain – for 
example about an anti-bias curriculum or school safety – would be helpful. 
9. Donor dual (federal/state)-track policies were criticized by other 
stakeholders, who say that they have a negative impact potential to 
strengthen clan divisions, undermine inclusive and democratic trends, and 
creates a favorable environment for the return of the organized chaos or 
warlordism in the country. 
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10. Stakeholders agreed divisions both among states and between the states and the 
center were magnified through a biased history and social studies 
curriculum. 
11. Private education quality and content varies considerably due to a lack of 
regulation in private umbrella schooling. There is a need to integrate private 
actors as key contributors and negotiators in establishing improved 
governmental regulation. 
12. Lack of concern by donors with militia influence may suggest a partial or full 
denial on the part of donors of the seriousness of militias in favor of 
supporting donor agendas, including profit-making and external political 
agendas with which they are aligned. 
On a more general level, this investigation into the potential contribution of 
stakeholder analysis to support an improved model of CSE illustrate the following: 
conditions in a CCI context offer opportunities to politicize content, support active militia 
recruitment, contribute to brain drain, further marginalize vulnerable populations, and 
degrade the quality of education in favor of profits and ideological ends. The permeation 
of clan politics at the federal level can result in a deflation of central governmental 
power, leaving relations of power to be expressed between various competing external 
influencing stakeholders on one hand, and internal fragmentary powers on the other, 
including clans and militias who variously align in pursuit of autonomous interests. This 
complex dynamic creates a need for more accurate stakeholder analysis, and the CSE 
tools employed in this study hold promise in this area.  
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In the end, stakeholders were made a bit more aware of the CSE model, key 
issues, their own position as stakeholders, and, fundamentally, a better understanding of 
stakes they may not have considered as closely before the study. This was a modest 
intervention, but one with possibilities for greater impact in the future. 
I wanted to understand the conditions necessary to foster a heightened awareness 
and sensitivity to nurture a dialogue and planning process that will lead to an education 
system that was reflective of bias, inequity, and promoted unity and justice. Along the 
way, I learned that CSE is as much about social and behavior change as it is about 
policies and institutions. By mapping key actors and their positions and behaviors, I was 
able to make progress on this goal. Tools alone do not lead to change; it is nurtured 
through dialogue, debate, and compromise, developing a shared context-specific 
understanding, discussing the relative trade-offs, and seeking a balance among 
stakeholders.  
Contribution to Education Field  
While the traditional analytical approaches for advancing conflict-sensitive 
education are strong in helping policy makers, donors, nonstate actors, and implementers 
conceptualize the features of education that could drive inequity and grievances, they fall 
short in terms of implementation of a conflict-sensitive education system, particularly 
because of the behavior and social change that is fundamental to the changes inherent in 
CSE. Using stakeholder analysis approaches include: identifying stakeholders, mapping 
stakeholder characteristics, assessing stakeholder characteristics, identifying resisters and 
facilitators, and utilizing findings to identity strategies that could be helpful in the public 
policy development process.  
 115 
Furthermore, traditional CSE analytical approaches are helpful in identifying key 
areas for policy reform, especially related to equity and inclusion. However, what is 
missing are analytical approaches and procedures that help to resolve some of the barriers 
to implement those policies, especially when key actors lack agreement on the policies 
and approaches themselves, or if they are benefiting from the status quo. While 
stakeholder analysis has been a common approach in the private sector, it has rarely been 
applied in the public policy domain. The approach of utilizing stakeholder analysis in this 
way to promote CSE, especially in a country as conflicted and fragmented as Somalia, 
has no precedent, and therefore can been seen as an innovation for education sector 
reform and planning.  
Suggestions for Future Research: Continued Investigation of 
Framework 
While this conceptual framework provides an important overview of the 
contribution of stakeholder analysis in operationalizing CSE, the leap between utilizing 
findings and the actions toward realizing equity and justice is a large and nontrivial one. 
Utilizing findings to taking action that results in the provision of more conflict-sensitive 
education needs to be unpacked in future research.  
This research represents the growing convergence of two previously discrete 
fields: education in conflict and crisis and stakeholder analysis. Therefore the subject 
reamins largely under-researched and -documented. As the idea of promoting CSE 
remains very new, somewhat theoretical, and for the most part untested, it is important to 
explore practical ways of applying this concept while at the same time observing the 
assumptions and gaps in the tools that currently exist. 
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Based on the limitations and findings of my research I have identified suggestions 
for future research:  
Applying stakeholder analysis in Somalia shows promise to contribute 
towards a national sector assessment, strategy and policy. Findings from this study 
show that, while there is considerable competition and conflict between the states, to 
some extent a result of the post-colonial experience of the country, education emerges as 
a sector where there is a great deal of agreement.  
This analysis could contribute to a sector-wide policy by highlighting one of the 
key findings – that a national education policy is a priority for all stakeholders. This 
would need to be followed by identifying the donors’ willing to finance this endeavor, 
convening and documenting more in-depth opportunities to contribute, and involving 
experts to assess some of the points of disagreement around history and inequitable 
resource allocation by state. Most importantly, the opinions, values, and priorities of 
stakeholders identified that were excluded from the study -- students, teachers, clan 
leaders, and the private sector -- will require further research and analysis. Leveraging 
their expertise and knowledge is a critical next step in order to ensure the policy is 
effective and has the confidence of the wider stakeholder community.  
Building on the findings about the role of private education “umbrella” 
networks. Private sector participation in the education sector in developing countries has 
been a topic of heated debate since at least the 1990s and the advent of Structural 
Adjustment Programs. The main debates lie around equity: Who has access to education, 
and how might private education provision further drive inequities and future economic 
prospects for marginalized groups? The question of to what extent the government is able 
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to regulate and ensure a basic standard across private education figures prominently in 
this debate. For crisis and conflict contexts, the stakes are even higher. The ability of a 
weak, fragmented, under-resourced central ministry to regulate and monitor private 
education is extremely low, enabling conditions for further fragmentation, questionable 
quality, and absence of standards in terms of teaching and learning. Interestingly, there is 
a high prevalence of private providers and nonstate providers in crisis contexts; for 
example, in Haiti, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Liberia.  
More research is needed in Somalia on the type of participation in private 
education: Who is enrolled? What is the urban versus rural enrollment? Are particular 
clans left out? What role can umbrellas play in advancing inclusion, well-being, and 
social cohesion? And finally, what are the pain points limiting private education actors 
from working more closely with the federal and state governments? What negotiations 
are needed to forge an improved relationship in which the MoE is able to regulate and 
monitor private education provision?  
Examining or testing my framework in a new context, location, or 
culture. The use of stakeholder analysis proved to be a very important methodological 
input for CSE in Somalia. Combining a robust stakeholder analysis with traditional 
education planning should be tested in other conflict-affected contexts. Research in South 
Sudan could help identify additional key stakeholders to the current group, which 
includes mostly International NGOs and donor governments at the moment. It could also 
surface important answers to the question, How is the current civil conflict affecting shifts 
in influence and power within the education sector? In South Sudan community groups 
and religious organizations have a history of providing education during the most 
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insecure times while Sudan and South Sudan were warring over a 20-year period. This 
process would also help donors better understand the sequencing and phasing for their 
investments; for example, in efforts to improve policy and action while there is civil 
conflict.  
Expanding the framework or model to the action and implementation phase. 
A major limitation of my research is a timeframe that ends at planning. The framework 
itself implies action and change; however, I was unable to follow the stakeholders 
through the action phase of their work. Combining this process with a developmental 
evaluation, which follows the stakeholders through their implementation phase, would 
allow for the utility of the stakeholder analysis methodology to be tested. For example, 
once the stakeholders reflect on their influence, power, and priorities, a realistic action 
plan could be devised to utilize findings and apply equity and justice. Further inquiry into 
the opportunities, challenges, and steps taken in this key phase is necessary.  
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APPENDIX A   
USAID CHECKLIST FOR CONFLICT SENSITIVITY 
CATEGORIES 
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APPENDIX B   
STAGES IN SOMALI HISTORY 
The recent history of Somalia from the 1980s can be divided into four main 
periods: each with its own context specific drivers related to conflict: civil war, state 
collapse, humanitarianism/failed state, and infant federalism. Throughout them all, the 
government has been unsuccessful at securing revenue from taxes needed to make 
progress on even the most basic state-building. For the most part, informal and local 
systems of governance have prevailed. As one of the world’s most troubled countries, 
Somalia has experienced multiple rounds of violence, insecurity, chaos, famines and 
droughts since 1960 when British Somliland and Italian Somaliland united and declared 
independence.  
In 1969 General Mohamed Siad Barre took control in a coup and formed a 
socialist state backed by the Soviet Union. In 1977 when Somalia invaded the Ogaden 
region of Ethiopia (a traditionally Somali region) a coalition of Ethiopian, Soviet, and 
Cuban troops forced the Somalis out. Barre then abandoned his Soviet allegiance and 
began to receive funding from the United States. The Ogaden war with Ethiopia led to a 
combination of brutal government repression, excessive clan cleavages, high levels of 
corruption, and low salaries, which contributed to the state’s decline (Menkhaus, 2007). 
As a result, the education system – previously a source of local pride – crumbled.  
Civil War, 1977 -1991: Significant armed conflict was absent during Somalia’s 
first 17 years (World Bank, 2005). During the period starting in 1977 the country endured 
three major armed conflicts: the Ogden War, the war between the Somali military and the 
Somali National Movement (SNM) for control over northwest Somalia and the clash 
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between government forces against a growing number of clan-based liberation 
movements in 1989 and 1990. 
Both internal and external factors caused the collapse of the Somali state. The 
combination of the legacy of European colonialism, which divided Somali people into 
five states, and the effects of wars with neighboring states like Ethiopia – coupled with 
competing values around the clan system, a centralized government, and the pastoral 
culture – drastically aggravated tensions and grievances. This environment was fertile 
ground for civil war and violence.  
Siad Barre, leading a military junta later known as the Somalia Revolutionary 
Socialist Party, was President of the Somali Democratic Republic from 1969 to 1991. His 
rule was known for a socialist approach of utilizing volunteer labor to provide food for 
the population and build roads, hospitals, and universities. Many industries were 
nationalized, and during this time a new standardized writing system for the Somali 
language was created. While Barre’s government promoted loyalty to the national 
government and attempted to clamp down on clanism, he became known to favor the 
three clans making up his family (Marehan, Ogaden, and Dhulbahante) (Metz, 1993).  
Meanwhile, drawing support from the Isaaq clan – one of the largest Somali 
clans, with members principally from Somaliland, the Somali regions of Ethiopia, 
Djibouti and Kenya - the Somali National Movement (SNM) was formed in 1982. Its 
1988 attack on some government barracks in Burco and Hargeisa, which involved killing 
nearly 50,000 people and forcing 650,000 to flee to Ethiopia and Djibouti, led to full civil 
war. As the Cold War came to an end, Somalia’s strategic importance to the West 
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diminished, along with foreign resources that were helping to keep the country afloat. 
The Barre regime lost control of the economy and the country in January 1991.  
State Collapse, 1991-1992: With no legitimate government in power, this period 
was plagued by famine and wars as clans fought to take control of both urban and rural 
assets. In just four months, nearly 25,000 people were killed in Mogadishu, 1.5 million 
reported fleeing the country for safety, and another 2 million counted as internally 
displaced. State collapse, asset pillaging, clan wars, and a drastic reduction in aid 
exacerbated the effects of the drought on the population, resulting in an estimated death 
rate of 250,000 (Healy & Bradbury, 2010). Meanwhile international attention to Somalia 
was limited given other priority global events, including the wars in the Gulf and the 
Balkans. In the absence of Western attention, regional efforts - with conferences in 
Djibouti - attempted to broker unsuccessful peace deals.  
The year 1991 was a turning point for Somalia; for the first time clan-based 
violence – as opposed to the traditional state-based violence – was used as a more 
widespread political instrument of war. In addition, civilians were incited to be 
perpetrators of this clan violence, beginning a period of what many called “clan ethnic 
cleansing.”  
As a contrast, in the northwest and northeast of Somalia, the collapse of the 
central government did not lead to the kind of warfare that devastated the south. By 1991, 
the SNM announced that northern regions were seceding from the state to form the 
Republic of Somaliland, which proceeded to build a modest functional state structure, 
including a tax system, functional ministries, a public school system, a police force, and 
municipal government administrative units (Lewis, 2008; Menkhaus, 2007).  
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Humanitarianism and Failed State, 1992-2000: During the decade following the 
Somali civil war, Western geopolitics were shifting. With a key focus on good 
governance as a development objective, global institutions like the UN were taking on 
new roles to manage and provide both humanitarian and military support to come to the 
aid of “failing states.” The collapse of Somalia posed a threat in the Horn of Africa, and 
more importantly in the aftermath of the Cold War “new world order” claimed by the 
West. In 1992, UN diplomatic engagement began with the UN Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM), but they were unable to stave off the famine or address the violence. By the 
end of 1992, in an attempt to bolster the mission and provide stability and security to the 
Somali capital, the US committed additional troops to UNOSOM. However, at this point 
the 30,000-troop mission was unable to reconcile disparities and end the violence. On the 
contrary, this period is known for fueling the war economy, increasing the number of 
factions, and propping up clan and warlord power structures, culminating the infamous 
Black Hawk incident and withdrawal of US forces (Healy & Bradbury, 2010).  
Following the departure of UNOSOM, the international community generally 
disengaged. This led to a revival of local governing processes, including both community 
and clan-based patronage systems like elders’ councils, district councils, and Sharia 
courts. Clan-based factions morphed into political parties. Although highly fragmented, 
these systems provided some degree of local dispute resolution and proved to be a bridge 
to later periods of governance. It is during this period when the Somaliland state 
succeeded, managing to establish peace and political order from the “bottom up” through 
local peace conferences and “national” clan conferences (Lewis, 2008). Councils created 
by predominant clans governed other regions. Remittances increased, with Somalis from 
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all over the world sending financial resources and investing in businesses in Somalia. 
With regional concern for security and economic stability, Ethiopia, Libya, and Egypt 
made attempts to broker peace deals. Ethiopia was specifically concerned with the 
growth of armed Islamic groups.  
Frustrated by the lack of steady progress, the Puntland State of Somalia was 
established in 1998. The goal of establishing Puntland State was to deliver services, offer 
security, and interact with international trade partners (Lewis, 2008). It is an autonomous 
regional administration, also based on consensus between local clans, and unlike 
Somaliland remains part of the Federal Somali State and adheres to the federal system.  
In 1999 the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA), with Ethiopian backing, gained 
control of Bay and Bakool regions and established an administration (Healy & Bradbury, 
2010). The RRA’s state goal is the creation and recognition of an independent state of 
Southwest Somalia. During this time, the RRA along with many other factions planted 
landmines as a means of deterring expansion of other factions and acquisition of territory.  
Infant Federalism, 2000–present: Donors began to re-engage with all three 
regions but largely with Somaliland and Puntland due to relative security, and in 2000 
Djibouti hosted the Somalia National Peace Conference, culminating in an important 
political breakthrough by producing a Transitional National Government (TNG), the first 
authority to govern Somalia since the Siad Barre regime. The TNG experienced some 
mild success in part due to a power-brokering arrangement known as the 4.5 clan power-
sharing formula (Menkhaus, The Crisis in Somalia: Tradegy in Five Acts, 2007). The 
Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) led by Abdullahi Yusuf opposed 
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the TNG. Ultimately, the TNG proved to be highly flawed and was criticized as a narrow 
alliance rather than a government of national unity.  
IGAD, headquartered in Djibouti, is an eight-country trade bloc in Africa. It 
includes governments from the Horn of Africa, the Nile Valley, and the African Great 
Lakes. IGAD’s mandate eventually included peace and security in addition to fostering 
regional cooperation and economic development. In 2002, IGAD took up the challenge of 
reconciling the TNG and the SRRC, culminating in a conference in Kenya. The 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) succeeded the TNG in November 2004. At this 
time, Somalia’s leadership shifted from the Mogadishu-centered, Hawiye- and Islamist-
dominated coalition to the federalist, Darood- and Ethiopian-backed coalition. Abdullahi 
Yusuf was chosen as the transitional president and ruled for four years (Healy & 
Bradbury, 2010). He experienced success in taking steps towards stability and security by 
establishing transitional institutions. Unfortunately, he was unable to institute any of the 
transitional tasks pledged by his government and eventually faced violent resistance from 
various clan factions who objected to many of his choices including the location of 
government seat, the composition of foreign peacekeeping troops. Paralleling these 
developments, over two decades, various Islamic orders emerged and attempted to 
establish an Islamic state in Somalia, exhibiting the beginnings of Al-Shabab.  
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APPENDIX C   
SOMALI ECONOMIC DATA 
Table C.1: Somalia Economic and Social Data (UN Statistics Division, 2018) 
Indicators Data Year 
Population  11,079 2016 
Population density per sq mile  17.7 2016 
GDP (million current US$) 1375 2014 
GDP growth rate (annual %, const. 2005 prices) 2.6 2014 
GDP per capita (current US$) 130.7 2014 
Gross Enrollment Rate Primary 42 2011 
Gross Enrollment Rate Secondary  8  
Unemployment (% of labor force) 7.5 Estimate 2014 
Unemployment Youth 14-29 67 2012 
Labor force participation (female/male pop. %) 33.2/75.9 Estimate 2014 
Population growth rate (average annual %) 2.4 2010-2015 
Urban population (%) 39.6 2015 
Urban population growth rate (average annual %) 4.1 2010-2015 
Fertility rate, total (live births per woman) 6.6 2010-2015 
Life expectancy at birth (females/males, years) 56.5/53.3 2010-2015 
Seats held by women in national parliaments (%) 13.8  2016 
Mobile-cellular subscriptions (per 100 inhabitants) 50.9Estimate.  2014 
Individuals using the Internet (%) 1.6 mill Estimate 2014 
 
 \ 
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APPENDIX D   
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 PURPOSE / 
RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
INTERVIEW 
QUESTIONS 
USE WITH 
   GOVT DONOR INGO NGO CS  
                
1 Identify the main 
purpose of the 
analysis;  
 
Develop an 
understanding of 
the system and 
decision makers  
1. What are the most 
salient CSE issues 
for your state 
(exclusion, 
curriculum, resource 
flows)?  
2. Related to these, 
Where do you have 
overlap with the 
interest other actors?  
3. Where do you 
have diversion?   
X X X X  
                
2 Draw out the 
interests of 
stakeholder (SH) in 
relation to the 
problems which the 
assessment/analysis 
and sector plan is 
seeking to address 
4. Have you heard 
of the plan to 
conduct a 
countrywide joint 
ESA that will lead 
to a 3-year national 
education sector 
strategic plan?  
X X X X X 
5. If so how did you 
hear about it?  
X  X X  
6. What do you 
understand this to 
mean?  
X X X X X 
7. What resources 
will you wish to 
commit (or avoid 
committing) to the 
joint 
assessment/analysis 
and sector plan? 
X X    
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 PURPOSE / 
RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
INTERVIEW 
QUESTIONS 
USE WITH 
                
3 Advisability of 
conducting an ESA 
8. Are you in favor 
of this activity?  
Why? - Probe for 
reasons related to 
how ESA is viewed 
in relation to 
negotiations across 
the three states that 
provides evidence 
for policies - 
policies that [may] 
provide for greater 
inclusion and 
contribute to peace. 
X X X X X 
9. Which of these 
categories best 
describes your 
opinion on this 
being proposed 
(Read the options 
and circle the 
answer given  
X X X X X 
a) I strongly support 
it 
     
b) I somewhat 
support it, it 
     
c) I do not support 
nor oppose it 
     
d) I somewhat 
oppose it 
     
e) I strongly oppose       
10. What are the 
potential benefits to 
you and your 
organization?  
X X X X X 
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  11. What are the potential 
disadvantages to you and your 
organization of this action as it has 
been defined? 
X X X X X 
12. If it is advisable, what are key 
issues that the ESA should address? 
How should it be organized? (links 
back to question 1 on CSE issues) 
X X X X X 
                
4 Process and 
management of ESA  
13. Who, (or what skills should the 
technical experts have) should lead 
the ESA, with what support team? 
Why? 
     
14. Who should be involved as key 
consultants/advisors? Why? 
     
15. Who should be consulted, how 
should that be managed? Why?  
     
                
5 CSE Dimensions        
Curriculum  16. Should ESA assess curricula? 
(primary, middle, secondary and 
accelerated) in relation to CSE  
X X X X X 
17. How is history is presented in the 
curricula? (Probe, are there initiatives 
on building “peaceful” social 
relationships within schools - 
regional, national initiatives; 
knowledge (of system) about peace-
building curricula from other 
countries and their relevance) 
X X X X X 
18. How would you describe the 
differences in the curricula between 
the three states?  
X X X X X 
Teacher Professional 
Development  
19 Should ESA assess Teacher 
Training Colleges (TTCs) and 
teacher training - from perspective of 
teachers’ ability to:  
X X X X X 
i) deal with current crisis/violence 
issues  
X X X X X 
ii) deal with post-conflict psycho-
social issues;  
X X X X X 
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iii) capacity/training to teach social 
studies so as to improve conflictual 
relationships 
X X X X X 
iii) capacity building to engender 
equity (avoid bias) in teaching 
practices and classroom management 
X X X X X 
                
6 Identify conflicts of 
interests between 
stakeholders, which 
will influence the 
assessment of risks 
20. Under what conditions would you 
choose NOT to support the proposed 
assessment/analysis and development 
of an education sector plan?  
X X X X X 
21. For those aspects that you 
oppose: 
a) In what manner would you 
demonstrate this opposition? 
b) Would you take the initiative in 
opposing it or would you wait for 
others to do so? 
c) Do you have financial or human 
resources available to support this 
policy 
X X   X 
22. Under what conditions would you 
come to support this assessment and 
development of an education sector 
plan?  
X X  X X 
                
7 Identify relations 
between stakeholders, 
which can be built 
upon, and may enable 
"coalitions" of project 
sponsorship, 
ownership and 
cooperation. 
23. What other organizations, 
departments within an organization, 
or persons do you think would 
support this joint assessment/analysis 
and development of an education 
sector plan? (Probe for MOE and 
non-MOE stakeholders) 
X X X X X 
24. What do you think these 
supporters would gain from this 
assessment and development of an 
education sector plan? 
X X X   
25. Which of these supporters would 
take the initiative to actively support 
this joint assessment/analysis and 
development of an education sector 
plan? 
X X X    
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26. What other organizations, 
departments within an organization, or 
persons do you think would oppose this 
assessment and development of an 
education sector plan? (Probe for MOE 
and non-MOE stakeholders) 
X X X   
27. What do you think these opponents 
would gain from preventing this joint 
assessment/analysis and development 
of an education sector plan?  
X X X   
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